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ABSTRACT
Organic food sales have steadily risen in the United States since
the 1990 ratification of the Organic Food Production Act and the
establishment of the National Organic Program in 2000. However, the
current definition of "organic" under the National Organic Program does
not accurately or comprehensively reflect consumer motivations for
purchasing organic foods. In most cases, consumers purchase organic
food because they presume it to be environmentally sustainable, socially
responsible,. and supportive of local or small farmers. This article sets
forth the problems with conventional agriculture and the subsequent
establishment of the National Organic Program in the United States.
Then, the article points out the flaws and the origins of those flaws in the
National Organic Program, focusing on the loose regulation of foreign
organics and the disconnect between consumer expectations and the
reality of certified organic products. Finally, it proposes a flexible,
supplemental set of organic standards whose implementation is currently
hindered by stringent regulation by the Food and Drug Administration of
"misleading" food labels. The proposed solution is to create an exception
for organic labels in the Food and Drug Administration's label regulations
to allow organic certifiers to create a plurality of organic labels that meet
consumer concerns regarding environmental sustainability, ethical labor
practices, food miles, chemical contamination of food and support for
community farming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Americans strive to make principled decisions about the
agricultural products they consume. In today's market, there are myriad
choices available to consumers; however there is little transparency in the
food labeling process to make these choices clear to consumers. To
address their concerns about agriculture and its environmental, health,
social, and ethical impact, many Americans are paying a steep premium
for products with the USDA organic label, assuming the organic seal
represents their values. However, this is not always the case. In fact,
while the organic label provides important information regarding pesticide
use, livestock feed, livestock pasturing, and restrictions on genetic
418
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engineering, the label is inadequate to do the job consumers assume it
does. In turn, without proper information regarding their organic
purchases, consumers cannot be a sufficient regulatory force on the
organic market. While the free market might be able to remedy this
problem with new labels regarding the precise processes an organic
product undergoes, the current Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
regulations will likely prohibit such labels as "misleading." Due to the
unique characteristics of the organic industry, the FDA should not strictly
regulate supplemental labels as misleading, but rather allow a labeling
system that reflects the panoply of reasons consumers purchase organic
food. This paper suggests a method of providing consumers with the
transparency of information they seek to make principled food decisions.
II. CONVENTIONAL AGRICULTURE
In order to fully appreciate the purpose and significance of the
organic food movement, one must first have a rudimentary understanding
of the realities of the conventional food system in the United States.
Before 1950, agricultural production depended largely on mechanisms
designed to strengthen the link between agriculture and ecology.' Crop
rotation, whereby farmers would plant different crops on different fields
during different seasons, served to naturally stave off insects, weeds, and
diseases by breaking their life cycles. 2 In addition to crop rotation, pre-
1950s farmers guarded against bad weather or pestilence by planting many
different crop varieties.3 This type of crop variation protected farmers
from losing everything due to crop-specific diseases or insects that favored
one crop over another, as well as protecting them from weather patterns
that disproportionately affected a certain type of crop.4 Although very
little machinery was used, most farms did not need to hire vast amounts of
cheap labor or specialized equipment for harvesting because the crop yield
1 Miguel A. Altieri, Modern Agriculture: Ecological Impacts and the Possibilities for
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was small enough for the family and community to perform most of the
required labor.' Despite the fact that this technique proved less productive
from a pure gross yield standpoint, 6 a less industrial method of farming
produced relatively few signs of environmental degradation compared to
the modem conventional methods.'
In contrast to this earlier, pre-1950s method of farming, modem
conventional agriculture puts an incredible strain on the environment
through industrialization, economies of scale, and increased pressure to
produce from the farming subsidy structure in the United States. Crop
rotation is no longer the preferred method to keep insects, weeds, and
5 id.
6 See, e.g., Holger Kirchmann et al., Can Organic Crop Production Feed the World?, in
ORGANIC CROP PRODUCTION: AMBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS 39 (Holger Kirchmann &
Lars Bergstrom, eds., Springer 2009) (claiming that organic yields are 25-50% lower
than conventional yields depending on manure quality); Paul Mider et al., Soil Fertility
and Biodiversity in Organic Farming, 296 SCI. 1694, 1694-95 (2002) (finding organic
crop yields to be 20% lower than conventional yields); N. Halberg & I. Sillebak
Kristensen, Expected Crop Yield Loss When Converting to Organic Dairy Farming in
Denmark, 14 BIOLOGICAL AGRIC. AND HORTICULTURE 25, 31 (1997), available at http://
orgprints.org/15850/l/15850.pdf (citing a 24% lower yield on organic dairy farms than
on conventional dairy farms in Denmark). There are some environmental scholars and
scientists, however, who believe that even gross yields can be improved upon by a return
to pre-industrial farming. See M~der, supra note 6, at 1697. These authors argue that
modem method of farming favors growing a single genetic strain of a single crop varietal
on all of a farmer's fields-a method known as monoculturization, as well as poor soil
nutrition. See Mider, supra note 6, at 1695; TONY WINCH, GROWING FOOD: A GUIDE TO
FOOD PRODUCTION 61 (Springer 2007) (advocating "break crops," or crop rotation, as a
way to reclaim crop yields diminished from the use of monocultures). Monoculturization
leads to the genetic vulnerability of American cropland, making it disproportionately
susceptible to disease and pestilence, thus rendering gross yields defenseless against the
possibility of total wipeout. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL (U.S.) COMM. ON GENETIC
VULNERABILITY OF MAJOR CROPS, GENETIC VULNERABILITY OF MAJOR CROPS 76-78,
127, 152-53, 264 (National Academy of Sciences 1974). Additionally, poor soil
nutrition negatively affects conventional crop yields because it stunts "biologic activity,"
or growth. See Mdder, supra note 6, at 1695.
7 See Altieri, supra note 1.
8 See William S. Eubanks, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and
Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 227-28,
251-52 (2009).
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diseases at bay; instead pesticides, herbicides, and other chemical inputs
are increasingly required to keep conventional crop production levels
high.9 Moreover, modem farming has moved away from planting a
variety of crops, and is increasingly drawn toward single-plant
monocultures. Alarmingly, planting only one genetic variety of a plant-
monocultures-makes American crops more genetically vulnerable to
plagues and dependent on high chemical inputs such as pesticides and
synthetic fertilizers.' 0 Furthermore, farming has increased in size over the
last sixty years to the point that most conventional farms today use
migrant laborers to help plant and harvest acres upon acres of farmland,
which are increasingly owned by fewer and fewer producers."
The technologies making this monumental shift toward specialized
monoculture crops and industrial-scale production possible are
collectively termed, rather inaptly, the "Green Revolution." 12 This
technological revolution included improved mechanization and
technology, the development of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, genetic
engineering, and the development of antibiotics and growth stimulants for
animals.13 The Green Revolution began after WWII in the 1940s and
continued through the 1960s, shifting the focus of American agriculture
toward high crop yields and the replacement of human labor with
machines and chemical technology.14 It has pushed modem farming away
from its "green" pastoral roots and toward an industrialized reality where
chemical pesticides, synthetic manures, machines, and migrant labor have
9 See Miguel A. Altieri & Clara Ines Nicholls, Ecological Impacts ofModern Agriculture
in the United States and Latin America, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE RURAL
ENVIRONMENT, 123, 124 (Otto T. Solbrig et al. eds., Harvard Univ. David Rockefeller
Center for Latin Am. Studies 2001).
'oSee id.
See generally Aimee Shreck et al., Social Sustainability, Farm Labor, and Organic
Agriculture: Findings from an Exploratory Analysis, 23 AGRIc. AND HUMAN VALUES
439 (2006).
12 See Altieri & Nicholls, supra note 9, at 124.
13 See Altieri & Nicholls, supra note 9, at 125; see also Mary Jane Angelo, Corn,
Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global
Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 602 (2010).
14 See Angelo, supra note 13, at 602.
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replaced the natural pest-resistance methods and socially responsible labor
systems of pre-1950s farming.!5
Although modem agricultural technology and the Green
Revolution are renowned by some as the miracle solution to world hunger
and a testament to human productivity, conventional agriculture today is
harming the environment at a distressing rate.' 6 Some of the ecological
problems most directly attributable to modem agriculture are problems
with soil, including erosion and nutrient depletion.' 7  Threats to the
national water supply also arise from environmentally irresponsible
agricultural methods, including water pollution, salinization, and
alkalization.' 8 Water pollution is often caused by pesticides, synthetic
fertilizers, and animal manure which end up as runoff and pollute nearby
water channels.19  Furthermore, modem agricultural methods are the
largest user of water in the United States, heavily contributing to water
shortages across the country.20
Modem agriculture further harms the environment through
greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn contribute to global warming.21
"Id. at 602-03.16 See, e.g., Kelly A. Leggio, Comment, Limitations on the Consumers'Right to Know:
Settling the Debate Over Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods in the United States, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893, 901 (2001) (defending the benefits of genetically modified
food); Eubanks, supra note 8, at 251-52 (noting that Norman Borlaug's high-yield wheat,
rice, and corn, which spurred the Green Revolution won him the Nobel Prize in 1970);
but see David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture:
Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 3, 4-5 (2002) (posing that the political vilification of industrial agriculture makes an
accurate analysis of the environmental implications of industrial agriculture and the
creation of a framework for the future impossible).
17 See Altieri & Nicholls, supra note 9, at 125.
18 Id.
1 See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 288 (2000).20 See Eubanks, supra note 8, at 254 (describing in particular a 2007 conflict between
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama about rights to water from the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin); see also Adelman & Barton, supra note 16, at 10.
21 See Adelman & Barton, supra note 16, at 15-17; Ruhl, supra note 19, at 291. The
three greenhouse gases that are emitted through modern agriculture are carbon dioxide,
422
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The conversion of natural land to cropland, use of chemical fertilizers, and
use of synthetic fertilizers all produce greenhouse gas emissions.2 2 When
transported by wind, these gases can do widespread damage not only to
the conventional farm, but also to the natural ecosystems surrounding the
farm.23 Animal waste is another agricultural source of air pollution, with
animal feed lots emitting dangerous toxins such as hydrogen sulfide,
ammonia nitrogen, and methane.24 Certain animal feeding operations
have been found to emit levels of hydrogen sulfide, a particularly toxic
and flammable gas, in excess of what the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") has determined is for safe production.2 5
Human health is also negatively impacted by these modem
agricultural methods. The water pollution and water threats that come
from farm fertilizers and livestock production endanger the health of the
water drinking population; as of the year 2000, more than 14 million
Americans drink herbicide- and pesticide-tainted water.26 Further, towns
with drinking wells located in close proximity to animal feeding
operations are in danger of ingesting water contaminated with nitrates;
citizens near livestock farms are also more likely to breathe in ammonia
nitrate emissions.27 Of course, one need not live in close proximity to a
farm or livestock operation to be in danger from modem conventional
farming methods. Dangerous air emissions from farms can travel great
methane, and nitrous oxide. Adelman & Barton, supra note 16, at 15-17; Ruhl, supra
note 19, at 291.22 Adelman & Barton, supra note 16, at 15.
23 d
24 See Ruhl, supra note 19, at 292; see also L. A. Harper et al., Direct Measurements of
Methane Emissions from Grazing and Feedlot Cattle, 77 J. ANIM. Sci. 1392, 1392
(1999).
25 See Ruhl, supra note 19, at 292.
26 Ruhl, supra note 19, at 284 (citing Penny Loeb, Very Troubled Waters: Despite the
Clean Water Act, the Quality ofRivers Worsens, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 28,
1998, at 43).
27 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNSEL INC., America's Animal Factories: How States Fail
to Prevent Pollution from Livestock Waste, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL & CLEAN
WATER NETWORK 76 (1998).
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distances to cities and other urban centers. 28 Finally, the traditional
synthetic fertilizers that are used on most conventional farms produce
nitrogen oxide emissions in the air.29 Nitrogen oxide is a component of
tropospheric ozone, a component of smog and a serious threat to human
health.30
Modern agriculture has further harmed human health indirectly by
impacting the foods people eat. The increasing specialization of farms due
to agricultural technology and federal commodity subsidization has led
American farmers to 3ow more and more corn because of its hardy
quality and high yield. The glut of corn on the market has in turn led to
an increase in corn-products, such as high fructose corn syrup and corn-
based livestock feed.32 A national diet of high fructose corn syrup and
other corn-based products has been linked to obesity and diabetes in
humans.33 Furthermore, forcing livestock to eat corn-based feed has made
the meat, eggs, and milk they produce fattier and therefore less
nutritionally sound for human consumption. 34 Corn is an unnatural
foodstuff for livestock, such as cattle, whose digestive systems are not
made to process corn. 35 In order to fend off the natural diseases and health
problems which arise from their unnatural feed, producers often give their
animals subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics.36 These antibiotics eventually
28 Carol J. Hodne, Rural Environmental Health & Industrial Agriculture: A Case
Example of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RURAL
HEALTH, 61, 64-65 (Nina Glasgow et al. eds., 2004).
29 P.A. Matson et al., Agricultural Intensification and Ecosystem Properties, 277 SCI.
504, 507 (1997).
30 Id
3 See Hodne, supra note 28, at 67 (commenting on the economic advantages for farmers
who grow only corn).
32 See Angelo, supra note 13, at 612.
3 See, e.g., A. Bray, Samara Joy Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, Consumption ofHigh-
Fructose Corn Syrup in Beverages May Play a Role in the Epidemic of Obesity, 79 AM. J.
CLINICAL NUTRITION 537, 537 (2004); see also Angelo, supra note 13, at 612.34 See DAVID E. COOPER & JOY PALMER, JUST ENVIRONMENTS: INTERGENERATIONAL,
INTERNATIONAL, AND INTERSPECIES ISSUES 164 (Routledge ed., 2005).
" See id at 160.
36 See, e.g., Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act, S. 619, 111 Cong.
(2009); see also ROBERT F. KAHRs, GLOBAL LIVESTOCK HEALTH POLICY: CHALLENGES,
OPPORTUNITIES, AND STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION, 39 (Iowa State Press, 2004).
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make their way into the human population, which has been cited by some
as contributing to an increase of antibiotic-resistant bacteria colloquially
known as "superbugs." 37
Because modern agriculture is so harmful to the environment and
to human health, consumers began to look for a more earth and body
friendly alternative, and organic food moved onto the national scene.38
III. ORIGINS AND PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM
In the years since Congress passed the Organic Food Production
Act ("OFPA") in 1990 and the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA") implemented its regulations with a final rule in 2000
establishing the National Organic Program ("NOP"), organic food sales
have been steadily rising.3 9 In 2006, the Harris Study concluded that U.S.
organic food sales were growing by 21% annually. 40 Similarly
documenting the rise in organic food sales, the Organic Trade
Association's ("OTA") 2007 Manufacturer Survey found the American
public purchased $16.7 million worth of organic products in 2006, or 2.8%
of total U.S. retail food sales.4 1 By 2008, over 70% of American grocery
stores stocked organic foods, demanding a price premium of 20-30% for
their organic products.42 Consumers are willing to pay such a price
" See S. 619, 11 1th Cong. (2009).38 See, e.g., Laura T. Reynolds, Re-embedding Global Agriculture: the International
Organic and Fair Trade Movements, 17 AGRIC. & HUMAN VALUES 297, 299-300 (2000);
Colin Macilwain, Organic: Is it the Future ofFarming?, NATURE 428 (Apr. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v428/n6985/full/428792a.html.
3 Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); National Organic Program, 65
Fed. Reg. 80,548 (2000); Claire S. Caroll, What does "Organic" Mean Now? Chickens
and Wild Fish are Undermining the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 14 S.J.
AGRIC. L. REv. 117, 118 (2004) (noting that investors pressure legislation to support the
growing organic market).CHERYL BALDWIN, SUSTAINABILITY IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 162 (Wiley-Blackwell and
the Inst. of Food Tech. eds., 2009).
41 Organic Trade Ass'n 2007 Manufacturer Survey, available at http://www.ota.com/pics/
documents/2007ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
42 Carolyn Dimitri & Catherine Greene, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Recent Growth Patterns
in the US Organic Foods Market, 1 (2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/aib777/aib777b.pdf; Tom Philpott, Up Against the Wal-Mart: Big Buyers
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premium because they believe the organic seal on the product indicates a
certain level of quality and process.43 That is to say, they trust that the
provisions of the OFPA and the NOP are in line with their own values
regarding organic food." However, the terms of the OFPA and the NOP
are not necessarily clear to the growing population of consumers who buy
organic products. 4  An understanding of the provisions of the OFPA and
the NOP is necessary to an understanding of the problem facing the public
today.
A. The Necessity of a Federal Definition of "Organic"
The Organic Food Production Act was originally designed to
clarify a confusing array of competing state and private definitions of what
46
organic meant. Since the 1970s, industry and state use of the term
"organic" created a plethora of confusing marketing strategies that put
consumers at risk of fraud and deception.
The organic food industry began in the United States with a
Pennsylvania farmer, Jerome Rodale, who first promoted the use of
Make Organic Farmers Feel Smaller Than Ever, GRIST: ENVTL. NEWS & COMMENTARY,
(Aug 23, 2006), http://grist.org/comments/food/2006/08/23/buyers/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2010).
43 See Baldwin, supra note 40, at 166 (citing a study showing that just under half of
polled consumers understood what percentage of organic ingredients was guaranteed by
the USDA Organic seal).
" See id.
45 See Dr. Stephen Barrett, "Organic" Foods: Certification Does Not Protect Consumers,
(July 17, 2006), http://www.quackwatch.org/O1QuackeryRelatedTopics/organic.html
(stating that many consumers who pay the organic price premium believe that organic
foods are healthier and safer, despite the fact that the USDA position is that "[n]o
distinctions should be made between organically and non-organically produced products
in terms of quality, appearance, or safety.").
46 See Jean M. Rawson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG., Organic
Agriculture in the United States: Program and Policy Issues, 4 (2006).
See Kyle W. Lathrop, Note, Preempting Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation of
Organic FoodLabeling, 16 J. CORP. L. 885, 890-92 (1991) (discussing consumers' need
for uniform definition of the term "organic").
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compost over chemical pesticides and fertilizers.48 Rodale's views gained
popularity with the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring,'A9
and by the early 1970s, a small-scale, direct marketing organic industry
was born.5 0 However, some farmers and producers tried to take advantage
of the lack of regulation surrounding the term "organic" by labeling
conventional foods organic and demanding the organic premium for
them.5' States first responded to the confusion and fraud on the organic
market with organic certification laws in the 1970s.52 Oregon was the first
state to establish definition of organic in 1973, followed by California in
1979.53 By 1991, twenty-two states had passed an organic regulation, with
no two definitions of organic identical, and industry definitions were
equally abundant and changeable. 54  This confusing array of state
definitions and industry definitions led consumers to demand a standard
federal definition of organic they could rely on when making purchases.5 5
The lack of uniformity negatively affected individual consumers,
the domestic organic market, and the international organic market. 56
Consumers, often uncertain about the reliability or consistency of an
organic label, were hesitant to pay a premium price without certainty in
what they were purchasing.5 7 Additionally, producers were reluctant to
put forth the extra effort and cost to provide organic food because the
48 See PHILIP CONFORD, THE ORIGINS OF THE ORGANIC MOVEMENT 99-102 (Floris Books
ed., 2001).
49 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin, 1962). Carson's Silent Spring
was a "startling and inflammatory book" credited with galvanizing the environmental
movement in the United States. See National Resources Defense Council, The Story of
Silent Spring, available at http://www.nrdc.org/health/pesticides/hcarson.asp.
so Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic? The USDA's Misleading Food
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 379, 381-82 (2005) (discussing Jerome Rodale,
founder of the organic food industry).
5 1 id.
52 Lathrop, supra note 47, at 891-92.
5 1 Id. at 891.
54 Id. at 891-92.
ss See id. at 892; see also 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).
56 See THE CONVERSION TO SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE: PRINCIPLES, PROCESSES AND
PRACTICES 58 (Stephen R. Gliessman & Martha Rosemeyer eds., CRC Press 2010).
57 See Center for Resource Economics, FARM BILL 1990: AGENDA FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT AND CONSUMERS 22-23 (1989).
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market was unreliable, and composed of distrusting and sometimes
uneducated consumers. Lastly, the creation of a standard definition was
thought useful for international organic trade and foreign trust in U.S.
59organic exports.
B. Organic Standards
The Organic Food Production Act of 1990 ("OFPA") regulated the
organic market by directing the USDA to set national standards for
organic food. 60 The purpose of the OFPA was threefold: to establish
national standards for the marketing or organically produced products, to
assure consumers of consistency in these organic standards, and to
facilitate interstate commerce in organic produce. 61 There was a
secondary goal of improving environmental sustainability through
stewardship of farmland and organic farming methods.62 The stated
market-based purpose of the OFPA, as well as the secondary Senate goal
of environmental sustainability, led to an elegant statute whereby the
federal organic labeling system would be overseen by the USDA and
executed by private certifying agents. 6 3
In 2000, the USDA created the National Organic Program
("NOP") to manage the organic regulations in accordance with the
OFPA.6 To further the intent of the legislature to create a thriving
organic market, the USDA placed responsibility for implementing the
organic regulations with the Agricultural Marketing Service ("AMS").65
Furthermore, the USDA's Secretary of Agriculture established an organic
certification program for producers and handlers of organically produced
5 See Lathrop, supra note 47, at n.55.
59 See Rawson, supra note 46, at 3-4.6o See 7 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (2006).6 1id.
62 H.R. Rep. No. 101-96, at 1174 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N
5286, 5699; Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for
Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 621, 653 (May 2010).
7 U.S.C. § 6503(a), (d) (2006).
65 Fed. Reg. 80, 548 (final rule Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205).65 Id.
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agricultural products by consulting with the National Organic Standards
Board ("Standards Board"). 66 The Standards Board, composed of fifteen
members with expertise in organic farming or a financial stake in the
organic market, was crafted in order to provide the Secretary with a panel
of scientists, farmers, retailers, environmental protection experts, and
consumer groups. 67 The statutory make-up of the Standards Board reflects
the original legislative purposes of market development and environmental
sustainability through congressionally mandated retailers and
environmental experts.
The federal standards for organic produce, as established by the
AMS in conunction with the Standards Board, are process-based and
input-based.6 The standards are process-based in that the regulations
focus almost exclusively on the food production process, not the final food
product.69 They are input-based because they focus on what substances
can and cannot go into the food production, such as pesticides and
synthetic chemicals, without detailed mention of different farming
methods, transport of produce, or other sustainability concerns.70 The
regulations allow the Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of
the EPA and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to establish a
"National List of Allowed and Prohibited Substances" as well as a list of
allowed products that have been determined safe for human health and the
environment.7 1
NOP regulations prohibit genetically modified food 72 from
receiving organic certification. 73 Specifically, NOP regulations state that
667 U.S.C. § 6518(a) (2006).
67 7 U.S.C. § 6518(b) (2006).
68See generally 7 C.F.R. pt 205 (2011) (regulating agricultural methods and identifying
substances acceptable for use on farms and with livestock that produce organic food).
See 7 C.F.R. pt 205; 7 U.S.C. §§ 6503(a), 6504(1)-(3) (2006).
70 7 U.S.C. § 6504(1) (2006).
71 7 U.S.C. § 6517(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). Inputs that are currently prohibited in organic
farming are synthetic fertilizers, nitrogen sources, natural poisons such as arsenic or lead
salts, plastic mulches, synthetic transplants, and plastic pellets for livestock. 7 U.S.C. §
6508 (2006).
72 Genetically modified food is also referred to as genetically engineered food,
bioengineered food, or GMOs.
7 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.105, 205.2 (2011).
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in order to be sold as "100 percent organic," "organic" or "made with
organic ingredients," an agricultural product must not be produced using
"excluded methods," which include cell fusion, microencapsulation and
recombinant DNA technology.74 Equally, organic production processes
exclude farming practices that would be damaging to soil or cause soil
erosion.75
These process-based and input-based regulations are better for the
environment than their conventional counterparts because they prohibit
synthetic pesticides and genetically modified food, both of which are
damaging to the environment. Pesticides in particular can be harmful to
the environment and human health, causing water pollution, growing
pesticide-resistance in diseases and insects, crop losses, and accidental
pesticide poisonings in humans.77 Although the prohibition on pesticides
and genetically modified food in the current organic regulations is more
environmentally sound and appears to be healthier than conventional
farming, the organic regulations do not address many concerns that are
important to consumers, including overall health and long-term
environmental sustainability. 79 Some disadvantages of these approaches
are that the process-based nature of the regulations ignores the possibility,
for example, that organically produced food can be tainted by pesticides
7 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.105, 205.2 (2011).
7 See 7 C.F.R. § 205.203 (2011). The importance of healthy soil to a farming system
cannot be overstated. If the farm is viewed as an independent ecosystem, the health of
the soil is vital to the survival of the farm ecosystem. In fact, healthy organic soil has
been found to produce greater long-term profitability for farms because of the higher soil
quality in organic agriculture. John P. Reganold, Effects ofAlternative and Conventional
Farming Systems on Agricultural Sustainability, FOOD & FERTILIZER TECH. CENTER 2
(2007), available at http://www.agnet.org/htmlareafile/library/20110726133921
/bc44001.pdf.
76 See Altieri & Nicholls supra note 9, at 124, 129.
n David Pimental, Anthony Griener, & Tad Bashore, Economic and Environmental Costs
ofPesticide Use, in ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, 122-33
(John Rose ed. 1998); Carroll, supra note 39, at 120.
78 Graham M. Wilson, 23 Va. Envtl. L. J. 351, 378 (2004); see also Susan Heavey,
Factbox: Genetically modified animals in the U.S., REUTERS, Aug. 31, 2010, http://www
.reuters.com/article/2010/08/31/us-fda-biotech-salmon-fact
box-idUSTRE67U2OK20100831.
7 See infra part V. C.
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blowing onto the foods from nearby fields.80 The input-based nature of
the regulations similarly ignores the possibility that consumers who buy
organic foods are interested in more than what pesticides went into the
food production.
C. Organic Certification
To be certified organic and receive the "USDA organic" seal,8 1 a
farm must go through a rather lengthy and costly conversion process.82
First, a farm must not use any of the prohibited items on the National List
for a full three years before certification; similarly, livestock producers
must feed their livestock only organic feed for a full twelve months before
the sale of the milk or meat.83 Next, a farm must gain certification through
so See Friedland, supra note 50, at 391-97.
81 See 7 C.F.R. § 205.311 (2011). There are three different labels an organic product can
have: A "100% organic" product contains all natural ingredients, an "organic" product
must contain at least 95% organic ingredients, and a product "made with organic
ingredients" must contain at least 70% organic ingredients. 7 C.F.R. § 205.605 (2011);
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., NAT'L ORGANIC PLAN: BACKGROUND
INFo., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004443.
82 7 C.F.R. § 205.642 (2011); 7 U.S.C. §§ 6504(2), 6505(a)(2) (2006); A. Bryan Endres,
An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with Big Organics
and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry's Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
17, 31 (2007). The cost of certification can be a particular hardship for farmers who do
not own the land they till because the transitioning tenant farmer might find it difficult to
convince his landlord that conversion is cost-effective. Id. Despite the eventual profit
increase from the organic price premium, transitioning farmers and landowners must deal
with a three-year period of diminished profits and increased costs while the farm is
converted. Id. Moreover, the typical year-long agricultural lease does not provide the
assurance that a transitioning farmer would need that in three years, he will be able to
reap the benefits of his conversion labors. Id. Additionally, the landowner might not
wish to be bound to a lease longer than the traditional year-long lease. Id. National
organic standards only apply to farmers who sell more than $5,000 annually, likely due to
the cost of conversion and certification. 7 C.F.R. § 205.101(a)(1) (2011); 7 U.S.C. §
6505(d) (2006). Farms that make less than $5,000 annually are not held to the OFPA
requirements and may market their produce as organic even if it does not meet the USDA
standards. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.101(a)(1).
7 C.F.R. § 205.105, 205.603 (2011); 7 U.S.C. §§ 6504(2), 6509(c)(1), (e)(2)(B) (2006).
Organic livestock, like produce, has a list of prohibited inputs for animals, including but
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an accredited certifying agent. 84 To gain certification, the farmer or
livestock producer must create an organic plan for future management of
crops and livestock that must be approved by the certifying agent.
Certifying agents must apply to the USDA for accreditation.
These government organizations, independent organizations, and
individuals must first submit an application to the Secretary of Agriculture
showing their expertise in organic farming. The Secretary must then
determine whether the petitioning certifier has sufficient expertise to be
accredited. Furthermore, the Secretary may establish a peer review
panel to evaluate the petitioner's qualifications to be an accredited
certifying agent. 89 Each certifying agent must include a provision for
annual on-site inspection of producers and periodic residue testing of
products for prohibited inputs or pesticides in organic plans.90 The
certifier is then responsible for collecting the cost of certification from
producers in the form of reasonable fees.91
Admirably, the OFPA is designed to reduce the governmental cost
of organic certification by shifting the burden to certifiers, and therefore to
consumers who directly benefit from the organic product.92 This fiscally
prudent framework, however, can be problematic as it creates a "race to
the bottom" among certifiers who are competing with one another for the
business of aspiring organic producers.93 While this naturally occurring
race to establish lenient standards and fee competition might be stopped
not limited to plastic pellets for roughage, subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics, and
medication in the absence of illness. 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.2, 205.604 (2011); 7 U.S.C. §
6509(c)-(e) (2006).
84 7 U.S.C. § 6514 (2006).
857 C.F.R. § 205.401 (2011); 7 U.S.C. § 6504(3) (2006). The organic management plan
must regulate the application of manure, be designed to foster soil fertility, and contain
Frovisions for organic product handling and processing. 7 U.S.C. § 6513(b) (2006).
7 U.S.C. § 6514(b)(1).
877 U.S.C. § 6514(b)(2).
887 U.S.C. § 6514(b).
89 7 U.S.C. § 6516; see infra part V. C.
90 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(5).
7 U.S.C. § 6506(10) (2006).
92 See id.
Endres, supra note 82, at 32-33.
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by proper USDA/AMS oversight, as mandated in the OFPA, enforcement
continues to be a problem for the NOP.94 In the 2010 Audit Report, the
USDA Office of Inspector General found that NOP officials failed to
properly oversee and regulate the NOP standards. 95
The Office of the Inspector General is tasked with issuing a
comprehensive audit and accompanying recommendations to the AMS to
improve the oversight of the NOP. The 2010 audit report found that
AMS officials do not take the appropriate enforcement actions against
certifiers who fail to comply with organic standards, or delay enforcement
action for a significant period of time. 97 This oversight results in so-called
"organic" operations using prohibited pesticides and failing to pay the
civil penalties for NOP violations as mandated in the OFPA. The AMS
further failed to assemble a peer review panel to annually evaluate USDA
accreditation procedures and failed to perform any residue testing at all,
both of which are required by the OFPA under certain circumstances. 99
The failure of the USDA to properly oversee the certifying agents and so-
called "organic" producers who operate under the NOP directly
contributes to the certifiers' race to the bottom and the undermining of
organic regulations in the United States.
D. Foreign Organics
Many difficulties in organic enforcement come from the challenges
of overseeing organic imports from foreign countries. 100 The OFPA
allows for imported organic food, provided that the Secretary determines
94 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, Audit Report
01601-03-Hy, Oversight of the Nat'l Organic Program, 2-3 (March 2010) [hereinafter
"Audit Report 2010"] (describing and enumerating the NOP flaws in enforcement of
USDA organic regulations and standards).
" See id. at 2-3.
9 6 See id. at 11.
97 Id. at 8.
9 8 Id. at 8-9. One of the prohibited pesticides that the Office of the Inspector found in use
on so-called "organic" farms was paraquat-a highly toxic herbicide. Id. at n. 19.
99 See 7 U.S.C. 6506(a)(6) (2006); 7 U.S.C. § 6515 (2006); Audit Report 2010, supra
note 94, at 18-19.
00 See Audit Report 2010, supra note 94, at 28-30; Endres, supra note 82, at 27-28.
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such products have been produced in compliance with an organic
certification program equivalent to the NOP.o'0 However, in recent years,
the amount of organic fraud relating to foreign imports is staggering.102
Part of the problem is a chronic undersupply of organic products in the
United States. 103 For example, the organic meat market is highly
dependent on imports, with imports accounting for more than 60% of
organic pork sold in the U.S., due to the lack of an infrastructure designed
to support a domestic organic meat market, including an insufficient
number of organic certified slaughterhouses, processing plants, and
distribution channels. 1 04
Unfortunately, despite the high percentage of organic imports, the
AMS has not made adequate provisions to perform the recuired onsite
reviews of five of the forty-four foreign certifying agents.' 0 These five
unsupervised foreign agents certify approximately 1,500 foreign organic
operations; NOP officials have little assurance that these 1,500 foreign
organic operations are complying with USDA regulatory standards.
Lack of oversight of foreign organic operations lead to mislabeled
101 7 U.S.C. § 6505(b) (2006). NOP allows for three options for permitting imported
agricultural products, including (1) a USDA accredited certifying agent certifies the
foreign product, (2) the USDA recognizes the ability of the foreign government to
accredit their own certifiers, and (3) the USDA negotiates an equivalency agreement with
the foreign government. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, N.E.
REGION, Audit Report 01001-02-Hy, Agric. Mktg Serv. Nat'l Organic Program, 3 (July
2005).
1o2 See Audit Report 2010, supra note 94, at 28.103 See ALICE BYERS, DANIELE GIOVANNUCCI & PASCAL LIU, VALUE-ADDING
STANDARDS IN THE NORTH AMERICAN FOOD MARKET: TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN
CERTIFIED PRODUCTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, FAO COMMODITIES AND TRADE
PAPER, 18 (Pascal Liu et al. eds., 2008).
104 Endres, supra note 82, at 27.
105 7 C.F.R. §205.508(b) (2011); Audit Report 2010, supra note 94, at 28. The AMS's
excuse for not performing the on-site reviews of these five foreign certifying agents was
that the agents were located in three countries with travel warnings issued by the U.S.
Department of State: Israel, Bolivia, and Turkey. See Audit Report 2010, supra note 94,
at 29. However, the warnings did not prohibit travel, and in fact many Americans
traveled to those countries during the years when NOP officials failed to perform their
on-site reviews. See id.
1o6 Audit Report 2010, supra note 94, at 28.
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products, the use of uncertified livestock feed, and a failure to maintain
certification records.10 7 Additionally, onsite inspections and certification
decisions were made by the same individual, against NOP requirements,
creating conflicts of interest that were not disclosed by the certifying
agents. o0 Moreover, China, which is on the way to becoming the world's
largest exporter of so-called "organic" foods, has an institutional history of
corruption and fraud as well a problem with pollution and toxic sludge,
lending little credibility to the quality of the exports.109
Despite foreign organic fraud, lower production costs make foreign
organic producers attractive to large supermarket chains. Thus their
products have become prominent, albeit questionable, organic choices for
consumers.11 0 For instance, Wal-Mart's dependency on foreign sources
such as China can lead to increasingly large and widespread imports of
foreign food that is marketed under the organic label, yet whose process
information is unknown or substandard.'
IV. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION REGULATION OF
"MISLEADING" LABELS
Although under the organic regulations, private certifiers may
permit the use of their own label in addition to the USDA "organic" label,
organic food is still subject to the food labeling regime of the FDA. 12In
the last few decades, the FDA has begun regulating food labels as
10 7 Id. at 28.
1os Id. at 29-30.
109 MARK ALAN KASTEL, CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE, WHITE PAPER, WAL-MART: THE
NATION'S LARGEST GROCER ROLLS OUT ORGANIC PRODUCTS: MARKET EXPANSION OR
MARKET DELUSION? 8 (Sept. 27, 2006) (noting a Beijing Consumers Association report
stated that 10% of Chinese organics were counterfeit).
110 Endres, supra note 82, at 27.
11 See KASTEL, supra note 109, at 6-7.112 Renee Johnson, Organic Agriculture in the United States: Program and Policy Issues,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 4 (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL31595.pdf, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
While the USDA requires pre-approval of all labels, the FDA may only review labels
after the food product is marketed. See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§1451-1461 (2010); 9 C.F.R. §317.4 (1990).
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"misleading" despite the information's relevance to the consumer." 3 This
stringent regulation of "misleading" labels is dangerous to the organic
industry because it may prevent producers from affixing labels or
additional certifications that make a value judgment about the superior
quality of organic products. These labels that indicate values, however,
are precisely what consumers are looking for when they purchase organic
products.1 14
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"),
the FDA can prohibit voluntary food labels and claims if they appear to be
"misleading."" 5 To determine whether a label is misleading, the FDA
considers to what extent the label "fails to reveal facts material" in light of
the representation on the label or claim." 6 A label is prohibited if it
affirmatively misleads a consumer, omits information that is "material," or
if specifies information that would cause a consumer to mistakenly
purchase a product due to a confusing or deceptive label."' 7 Therefore, the
crux of the FDA analysis is inextricably linked with whether the
information is important to consumers.118  In the past, the FDA has
113 See, e.g. FDA GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING
WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING;
DRAFT GUIDANCE, January 2001, [hereinafter "FDA Guidance for Industry:
Bioengineering"] (the FDA has found that consumer interest is not enough to allow
producers to label their products as having been produced without genetic engineering);
see also Memorandum from the Mellman Group to the Pew Initiative On Food And
Biotechnology (2006), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Public
Opinion/Food _andBiotechnology/2006summary.pdf (discussing that public opinion
weighs in favor of more information about whether their food was bioengineered).
114 See Organic Foods Continue to Grow in Popularity According to Whole Foods
Market Survey, (Oct. 21, 2004), http://wholefoodsmarket.com/pressroom/blog/2004/10/
21 /organic-foods-continue-to-grow-in-popularity-according-to-whole-foods-market-sur
vey/.
"s 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(n) (2006).
116 id
117 See id.
11 Lara Beth Winn, Special Labeling Requirements for Genetically Engineered Food:
How Sound are the Analytical Frameworks Used by FDA and Food Producers?, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 667, 670 (1999).
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regulated labels such as "fresh" and those that show a product's
geographic origin under the misleading standard of Section 321 (n).11 9
The FDA's regulation of misleading food labels can be very
helpful to consumers when information about a product is otherwise
difficult to ascertain. For example, in 2003, the Smucker's company was
cited under Section 321(n) for a label on its spreadable fruit which read
"100% Simply Fruit" when in reality, the spread contained less than 50%
of the identified fruit flavor, and over 50% of varied fruit syrups.' 20 In this
case, the FDA's regulation of claims that are misleading will protect
consumers who would otherwise be misinformed, and might purchase the
fruit spread based on the misleading label.
However, in other situations, where consumers require more
information to make principled purchasing decisions, the FDA's
regulation of misleading claims can hamper consumers' ability to make an
informed choice. For example, the FDA has decided it is misleading to
claim that a food is free of genetically modified organisms or does not use
bioengineering.121 The FDA justifies this regulation because most foods
do not contain "organisms" at all and because such a claim implies that
bioengineered food is inferior to food that was created without
bioengineering.122 The FDA has determined that use or non-use of genetic
engineering in food production does not create a material difference in
food; therefore no value judgment, including a judgment that non-
genetically modified food is safer, healthier or of higher quality, may be
implied by a label indicating the absence of genetic engineering.123 This
stringent application of the FDA's mandate against misleading labels
"' See id. at 676-77.
120 Letter from Michael F. Jacobson, Ph.D., Executive Director, Center for Science in the
Public Interest to Joe Levitt, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition,
Food and Drug Administration (May 13, 2003), http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/
smuckers-complaint.pdf.
121 See FDA Guidance for Industry: Bioengineering, supra note 113, at 3, 6.
122 Id. at 5.
121 See id. at 6.
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contradicts consumer interests, which are overwhelmingly in favor of
knowing whether or not their food was created with bioengineering.124
V. CONSUMERS AND THE OFPA
A. The Benefits of Market-Driven Legislation
The OFPA is an example of a market-driven law designed to
provide consumers with information about a product in order to influence
that consumer's purchasing decision.' 25 The OFPA forces producers to
disclose information to a third-party certifier and eventually to the
consumer, which in theory, allows consumer markets to provide
regulatory pressure by demanding this. information reflect certain
standards. There is evidence in favor of the effectiveness of market-driven
laws, which shows that consumers can be an efficient regulatory force.126
For instance, whereas government authority on food quality issues is
compartmentalized between different regulatory agencies, including the
USDA, FDA, and the EPA, consumers are not similarly pigeon-holed;
consumers as a single group can comprehensively assess the variety of
risks and benefits associated with a purchase in a way that no single
government authority can.127
Additionally, lawmakers are prone to oversimplify consumer
choices.128 Genetically engineered food presents a good example of the
124 Memorandum from the Mellman Group to the Pew Initiative On Food And
Biotechnology (November 16, 2006), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew
trustsorg/PublicOpinion/FoodandBiotechnology/2006summary.pdf. In 2006, 34% of
American consumers believed genetically modified foods were basically safe, 29%
believed they were basically unsafe, and 37% did not have an opinion. Id. at 4.
Interestingly, 41% of American consumers who were aware of government regulation of
genetically modified foods said there was too little regulation, while 19% said there wasjust enough regulation and only 16% said there was too much regulation. Id at 5.
125 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: the Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 525 (2004).
See generally id. (stating that policymakers often underestimate the wisdom and
rationality of American consumers).127 See id. at 590.
121See id. at 584.
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consequences of this type of legislative reduction. The FDA has asserted
its position that genetically engineered food is safe for human
consumption when that food is physically identical to its conventional
counterpart.129 Therefore, no label is required on genetically engineered
food resembling and composed of the same ingredients as the non-
genetically engineered food it is modeled after. 130 However, many
consumers wish to avoid genetically engineered food because it violates
an ethical, environmental, or health-based principle that transcends
physical product difference, not because it differs physically or
nutritionally from conventional food.131
Consumers have often been ahead of the government regarding
supposed science-based regulation. Typically, consumers are more risk-
averse than regulators; when this risk aversion manifests itself through the
purchase of organic foods, these organic consumers are buying a type of
insurance against possible undiscovered or unproven risks of conventional
foods. 132 This insurance, paid through the organic price premium, is
expected to protect consumers against government regulation that might
be politically driven, corrupted by industry lobbies, or based on bad
science. 133 Consumers, unlike regulators, know and act on the assumption
that scientific dogma can be disproven and politics can influence
regulatory decisions.
129 FDA Guidance for Industry: Bioengineering, supra note 113.130 See id.
131 The Mellman Group, supra note 124, at 8.
132 See Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons From Organic Agriculture
For Market and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1568 (2007).
133 See id, at 1573. For example, in 2000 to 2003, the public became aware of the
possibility that a widely used pesticide called atrazine caused endocrine disruption in
humans. The consequences of such disruption were seen in puberty and reproductive
processes. Prior to 2000, in recognition of this danger, the EPA had mandated an extra
ten-fold margin of safety for atrazine's tolerance in humans. However, in 2000, the
pesticide industry successfully convinced the EPA to relax the ten-fold safety margin
because there was "no reliable evidence" that atrazine caused endocrine defects, only
studies that showed the potential risks. Id. at 1567-72.
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B. The Importance of Consumer Information
Ideally, the OFPA would direct the USDA to oversee a truthful
flow of information regarding organic production from farmer to
consumers who, in turn, would punish, or "regulate" those farmers that do
not live up to their organic standards.134 The vulnerability of the OFPA,
and, in turn the entire NOP, is that consumers must first receive the
specific type of information needed, and then understand and trust the
information in order to exert this regulatory pressure. Since information
about food is largely transmitted through food labels rather than direct
consumer-to-producer communication,' 3 the quality of the food label is
roughly equal to the quality of the consumer information, which then
reflects on the quality of the regulation itself.
The history of organic policy in the United States has been
consistently in favor of developing and facilitating a free market for
organics, rather than creating a subsidy system for direct government
support of organic food.136 This choice underscores the government's
general position on organic food: the organic sector is a marketing
opportunity and the food itself is merely a "differentiated product
available to consumers."1 37 Organic food, according to the government,
has no inherent value over its conventional counterpart; organic is simply
134 See 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); 7 C.F.R. § 205.102 (2011).135 Direct marketing is also an option for farmers and producers with small-scale
operations who sell their produce and animal products at local markets. However those
farms that engage in direct marketing typically are small enough to avoid the regulatory
regime of the NOP in the first place. See Kate L. Harrison, Note, Organic Plus:
Regulating Beyond the Current Organic Standards, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 211, 220
(2008).
136 See generally Carolyn Dimitri & Lydia Oberholtzer, Market-Led Versus Government-
Facilitated Growth, USDA WRS-05-05 (2005), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/WRS0505/wrs0505.pdf (describing the different organic policy approaches
taken by the United States and the European Union). In contrast to the U.S. market-
driven approach to organics, the European Union uses a regulation-driven approach and
provides green payments to farmers who choose to transition to organic production. See
id at 15.
' Id. at 2.
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another choice available to consumers.' 3 8 However, this reluctance to
make a value judgment on organic food is out of step with a consumer
demographic that purchases organic food, and indeed pays a price
premium, precisely because of a perception that organic food offers a
greater value than conventional food.
C. Dream v. Reality: Consumer Motivations for Buying "Organic"
Unfortunately, the USDA label is an insufficient guarantee for
what many consumers are looking for when they buy organic.' 3 9 There is
no single motivation for buying organic products, nor is there a single
definition of what organic means. "Organic" tends to refer to a
philosophy, rather than a concrete set of regulations or physical
characteristics of a certain product.14 0 According to the International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), the term
"organic" indicates a "production system that sustains the health of soils,
ecosystems, and people. It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and
cycles adapted to local conditions, rather than the use of inputs ... [it]
combines tradition, innovation and science to benefit the shared
environment."'41
Consumers instinctively relate to this definition when they
communicate their reasons for buying organic, citing health,
environmental sustainability, ethics, social justice, food safety, animal
welfare, taste, and overall quality.142 For instance, in a 2004 Whole Foods
Market survey, 58% of consumers believed organic foods were better for
the environment, 57% thought they were supporting small farmers with
organic purchases, 54% assumed organic was better for their health, and
11
8 See id. at 11.
139 Pollans, supra note 62, at 641.
140 Benjamin N. Gutman, Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime
to Organic Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2351 (1999).
141 Int'l Fed'n of Organic Agric. Movement, Definition of Organic Agriculture (2009),
http://www.ifoam.org/growingorganic/definitions/doa/index.html.
142 Renee Shaw Hughner et al., Who are Organic Food Consumers? A Compilation and
Review of Why People Purchase Organic Food, J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 94, 101-04
(2007).
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42% felt organics were of overall higher quality. 143 Three years earlier, in
a 2001 Food Marketing Institute study, 66% of consumers reported buying
organic food for health and nutrition, while 26% reported urchasing
organics for reasons of perceived environmental sustainability.'
In the past, organic food was sold predominantly through the
producers directly at farmers' markets or farm stands, or indirectly
through natural food and organic retailers.145 Because many consumers
who bought organic food for principled reasons trusted the retailer from
whom they were buying, the value of the organic label was less crucial.146
However, in recent years the number of consumers purchasing organic
food from conventional grocery stores has gone up precipitously.147 Since
2000, industry surveys indicate that over 50% of the total amount spent on
organic food, $7.8 billion annually, was purchased in conventional grocery
stores.14 8 The increasing availability of organics to consumers, both in
terms of price and presence in the grocery stores, has increased
consumption, creating a positive feedback loop and spurring mega-
143 Whole Foods Market, Organic Foods Continue to Grow in Popularity According to
Whole Foods Market Survey, (October 21, 2004), http://wholefoodsmarket.com/press
room/blog/2004/10/2 1/organic-foods-continue-to-grow-in-popularity-accord
ing-to-whole-foods-market-survey/; Dmitri & Oberholtzer, supra note 136, at 2. A
Harris survey from 2007, however, found that 40% of the 850 consumers polled bought
organic foods for perceived health benefits, while only 8% bought organic because they
thought it was better for the environment. See Baldwin, supra note 40, at 166.
'"Dimitri & Greene, supra note 42. Consumers also appear to be unaware of the
amount of organic ingredients included in USDA certified "organic" foods. See Baldwin,
supra note 40, at 166. Consumers also seem to be unaware of what the "organic" seal
truly means. A poll of 850 consumers found that almost half of consumers thought that
the USDA "organic" seal always indicated 100% organic ingredients. See Baldwin,
supra note 40, at 166. Only a quarter of the consumers understood that the label
"organic" indicated only 95% organic ingredients. See Baldwin, supra note 40, at 166.
145 Dimitri & Greene, supra note 42, at 2. From 1990 to 1996, specialty natural food
stores, which made up only 1% of the total food retail market, sold two-thirds of all
or anic foods. By 2000, natural food stores sold only 48% of all organic foods. Id.
14 See HELENA NORBERG-HODGE, TODD MERRIFIELD & STEVEN GORELICK, BRINGING
THE FOOD ECONOMY HOME: LOCAL ALTERNATIVES To GLOBAL AGRIBUSINESS, 43-44
(Kumarian Press Inc., 2002).
147 See Dimitri & Greene, supra note 42, at 2.
148 .s
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retailers to make organics even more available.14 9 For those consumers
who only began buying organic foods once they became more accessible
in the grocery stores, the integrity of the USDA label is particularly
meaningful, because the consumers might not be educated about the
difference between what the label means and what they seek by buying
"organic." These consumers likely were not an active part of the organic
movement when the OFPA and NOP were being constructed, and thus
probably do not already understand how narrow the USDA guidelines are.
Therefore, it is now, more than ever, that the USDA organic seal must live
up to its responsibility as an effective indication of the organic standards
that consumers want, rather than a formalistic stamp of approval for
market savvy mega-retailers. Unfortunately, there is an increasing
breakdown in communication between the consumer ideal that the organic
price premium indicates quality, environmental sustainability, and ethical
food processes and the reality of the USDA's minimal input and process-
based standards. 5 0
1. Organic Food Does Not Necessarily Come From Small Farms
The 57% of consumers polled who thought that organic purchases
support small, local farms are mistaken. 15 As discussed above, the USDA
organic label is a guide of process and inputs; it indicates that a product
has been created without synthetic pesticides or genetically modified
149 See NORBERG-HODGE, MERRIFIELD & GORELICK, supra note 146, at 106-08 (noting
the growth of mega-retailers in organic trade and advocating for a return to local organic
farming and avoidance of "artificially cheap, distantly produced products").50 See Whole Foods Market, Organic Foods Continue to Grow in Popularity According
to Whole Foods Market Survey, (October 21, 2004), http://wholefoodsmarket.com/press
room/blog/2004/10/2 1/organic-foods-continue-to-grow-in-popularity-accord
ing-to-whole-foods-market-survey/ (indicating that consumers buy organic food because
they perceive it as healthier and of environmental quality); but see 7 C.F.R. § 205.102
(2010) (showing that USDA organic standards are predominantly concerned with
disallowance of certain pesticides and genetic engineering, as well as ensuring certain
soil conservation practices in food production).
151 See, e.g., Endres, supra note 82, at 28; David Goodman, Organic and Conventional
Agriculture: Materializing Discourse and Agro-ecological Managerialism, 17 AGRIC.
AND HuM. VALuEs 215, 216 (2000).
443
A SUPPLEMENTAL LABELING REGIME FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTS
organisms, and it was grown on USDA-approved organic land with a soil
preservation plan.' 52 Contrary to the popular belief, federal organic
regulations favor large, industrial farms that can afford the cost of
transition and whose producers often own the land upon which they farm
and raise livestock. 53 Additionally, the low cost of international organic
imports disproportionately hurts small farms that cannot compete with low
prices made feasible by low foreign labor costs and questionable organic
certification systems." 4 Large industrial farms often do not adhere to the
organic philosophy that most consumers think of when they consider
organic purchases. For example, in 2007, a large-scale dairy producer
named Aurora Organic Dairy, was cited for failure to give its dairy cows
sufficient pasture land, as required by the NOP.ss Aurora eventually
settled this issue through a consent agreement with the USDA, but soon
after had to defend a class-action lawsuit against consumers alleging that
Aurora marketed milk as "organic" when in fact, it was conventionally
produced.15 6
The national standards for organic food also thwart local food
networks and small farmers by encouraging contract sourcing by national
supermarkets and mega-retailers such as Wal-Mart. 15 National
supermarket and mega-retailer chains recruit and contract with organic
152 Nat'1 Standards for Organic Prod., 7 U.S.C. § 6504 (2011).
153 See Endres, supra note 82, at 31.
154 See id. at 28; see also JIM BINGEN & LAWRENCE BUSCH, AGRICULTURAL STANDARDS:
THE SHAPE OF THE GLOBAL FOOD AND FIBER SYSTEM 207 (Springer ed., 2006) (noting
that in China, the advantages of size, infrastructure, state sovereignty, and
authoritarianism have led to a dominant market share for China in the international
market).
"s Consent Agreement, M-005-06, August 23, 2007, available at http://www.ams.usda
.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5063456; see also USDA, Q & A ON
THE AURORA CONSENT AGREEMENT, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5063458&acct-nopgeninfo; see also Press
Release, USDA, Aurora Organic Dairy Signs Consent Agreement with USDA's
Agricultural Marketing Service (Aug. 29, 2007), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/
1 ortal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2007/08/0228.xml.
5 Id.; Complaint P 2 West v. Aurora Daily Corp., No. 07-02625 (D.C. Colo. Dec. 18,
2007).
157 Goodman, supra note 151, at 216.
444
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 18, No. 3
growers in order to give that grower national exposure.1ss In turn, the
local food network is harmed as only the few organic growers with
contracts dominate the market due to their exposure in national chain
stores. 159 As illustrated by these examples, the consumer ideal of
supporting the environmental and community benefits of small, local
farms through organic purchases is not supported by the USDA organic
regulations.
2. Organic Does Not Indicate Ethical Labor Practices
Due to the reality that USDA certified organic enterprises can be
as large and as profit-driven as their conventional counterparts, consumers
who buy organic food because they want to support fair labor practices are
not achieving their goal.160 Organic farms often require more manual
labor than their conventional counterparts because they tend to use less
machinery. The prohibition on chemical pesticides also creates the
need for alternative forms of pest and weed control, which are usually
applied manually. Despite, or perhaps due to, their increased need for
manual labor, organic operations often use non-union, migrant laborers
and pay them the same low market wages 62 that conventional operations




161 FLORENCE I. SANTOS & CESAR L. ESCALANTE, FARM LABOR MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS OF ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL FARMS: A SURVEY OF SOUTHEASTERN
FARM BUSINESSES 1 (2010), http://www.ces.uga.edu/Agriculture/agecon/pubs/Outreach
%20Bulletin%20-%2OFarm%2OLabor/o2OManagement%2OSurvey.pdf
162 See Shrek, Getz & Feenstra, supra note 11, at 441. For example, market wages for a
migrant farmer working on an organic raspberry farm in 2006 were $500 a week at peak
season, but merely $200 a week during the rest of the year. Jason Mark, Workers on
Organic Farms Are Treated as Poorly as Their Conventional Counterparts, GRIST, Aug.
2, 2006, at 1, available at http://grist.org/article/mark/. Additionally, poor health among
conventional farm laborers is well documented, including illnesses from pesticide
exposure, the physical rigors of the job, and the psychological stressors of long hours and
poverty. See GLASGOW, JOHNSON & MORTON, supra note 28, at 174-77. Farm workers
are also disproportionately exposed to safety hazards from heavy farm machinery, knives,
and heavy lifting. See id. at 175.
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fair labor.163 In fact, organic farms often fail to provide living wages and
health insurance to farm workers, as do their conventional counterparts.'6
Unfortunately, there is also growing evidence that organic farms, like their
conventional counterparts, respond to efforts at employee unionization
with "intimidation and harassment."l65 Finally, there has been a noted
increase in allegations of sexual discrimination, minimum wage law
violations, and child labor law violations on large-scale organic farms.' 66
Even though USDA certified organic farm workers are often
treated as poorly as their conventional counterparts, consumers continue to
ascribe a socially responsible component to organic agriculture that does
not exist.' 67  Consumers might feel that because organic production
forbids many dangerous pesticides, working conditions are safer for
farmers on organic farms.168 Additionally, consumers might mistakenly
believe that the OFPA and the NOP have built in provisions for improved
working conditions.169 However, neither the OFPA nor the NOP include
any provisions that would improve working conditions or give any
additional rights to farm laborers.170 In an interview on the subject, a
representative of United Farm Workers pointed out the chasm between the
common consumer perception that organic workers are treated better and
163 See Goodman, supra note 151, at 216.
164See Shrek, Getz, & Feenstra, supra note 11, at 441.
165 Mark, supra note 162.For example, Willamette River Organics, a large Oregonian organic producer has been
charged several times with violating minimum-wage laws. See Mark, supra note 162.
Additionally, Threemile Canyon, an organic dairy farm in Oregon was charged in 2004
with sexually discriminating in hiring workers. See United Farm Workers, Key
Campaigns: Threemile Farms Chronology, http://www.ufw.org/page.php?menu=
organizing&inc=keycampaign/threemile/Threemilechron.htm.
'
67 See Shrek, Getz, & Feenstra, supra note 11, at 443 (noting that both farmers and
consumers often mistakenly believe that better working conditions are built into the
organic standards).
' See id. at 442.169 See id.
170See 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (1990); 7 C.F.R. § 205.102 (2011).
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the reality that organic producers are mirroring their conventional
counterparts in their treatment of farm workers.' 7'
3. Organic Does Not Mean Sustainable
Although organic farming adheres to several of the tenets of
sustainability, such as prohibiting pesticide use and mandating a soil
conservation plan,' 72 there is a notable difference between USDA organic
guidelines and sustainable farming. Sustainable farming, like the organic
philosophy, is difficult to define concretely because it incorporates many
different definitions and motivations. According to the EPA, sustainable
farming "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of further generations to meet their own needs."' 73 Sustainable farming
usually includes several of the following characteristics: "low-till"
farming, 174 crop rotation, 17 low-energy or renewable energy use in
production, water-saving methods, antibiotic-free and hormone-free
livestock, pesticide-free crops, animal welfare and animal rights, small
farms, local farms, low "food miles," 176 and pollution-prevention
techniques. 177
USDA organic guidelines are not characterized by sustainable
methods instead they adhere to a handful of the sustainable characteristics
171 See Mark, supra note 162.
1727 U.S.C. §§ 6508(b), 6513(b)(1) (2006).
173 U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/tsus.html.
174 No-till farming is a method of planting crops without plowing and without chemical
herbicides in order to reduce soil erosion and preserve soil nutrients. See Macilwain,
su ra note 38.
17 Crop rotation is the successive cultivation in a specified order on the same field to
conserve soil nutrition. See Altieri, supra note 1.
176 "Food miles" is the term to describe the distance a food has traveled from farm to
consumer. Food miles are a good indicator of the energy used to transport the food. See
Dept. For Env't, Food & Rural Affairs, Food Industry Sustainability Strategy 50 (2006),
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/policy/foodindustry/documents/fiss2006.pdf.
177 See generally Gale Buchanan, Address at the Sustainable Agriculture Research and
Education 20d' Anniversary at the New American Farm Conference (March 25, 2008),
available at http://www.sare.org/Events/Past-Conferences/New-American-Farm-Confer
ence-2008/Plenary-Speakers (discussing the role sustainable practices play in the national
economy, rural communities, and the future of agriculture law).
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above that are included in the national definition of "organic."1 78 For
instance, the USDA makes no mention of fuel efficiency in the NOP;
organic foods can travel trans-nationally and, increasingly, internationally
before arriving at their retail destination, logging hundreds or thousands of
food miles and using a significant amount of fossil fuels.' 79  Unlike
sustainable farmers, who are typically members of their farming
community, organic food can be produced by farming corporations whose
members neither live nor farm where the farmland is located. 180
Sustainable food is devoted to soil conservation and preventing soil
erosion,181 and although the NOP standards mention soil conservation,
these standards are often ignored by large-scale producers.182 Even in
organic agriculture, pervasive industrialization has taken hold; the
widespread use of specialized inputs like pesticides and other chemical
products to keep yields from being diminished by pests or disease runs
counter to the "philosophical and ethical foundations" of environmental
sustainability.183 Additionally, while sustainable food practices mandate
adequate pasture and free-grazing for livestock, organic food from large-
scale suppliers often does not provide such space for their animals.' 84
The USDA's choice to create a formal definition of organic that
encompasses only a few sustainable practices is logical in light of the
178 See JAMES E. HORNE & MAURA MCDERMOTT, THE NEXT GREEN REVOLUTION:
ESSENTIAL STEPS TO A HEALTHY, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 55 (Food Products Press
2001). As mentioned above, organic food adheres to the sustainable principles of no
pesticides, no genetic engineering, and soil conservation methods. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6504(1),
6513(b)(1) (2006); 7 C.F.R. § 205.105 (2011).179 See 7 U.S.C. § 6501; A. Christine Green, The Cost ofLow-Price Organics: How
Corporate Organics Have Weakened Organic Food Production Standards, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 799, 820-22 (2008).
180 Organic, SUSTAINABLE TABLE, September 2009, http://www.sustainabletable.org/
issues/organic/#difference.
Soil erosion causes problems for aquatic species that live, eat, and reproduce in waters
downstream of agricultural areas, resulting in many environmental hazards, including low
streambeds. See WALTER NEBEKER THURMAN, ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
OF FARM POLICIES 50 (AEI Press 1995).
' See 7 U.S.C. § 6513(b)(1) (2006); but see SAMUEL FROMARTZ, ORGANIC INC.:
NATURAL FOODS AND How THEY GREw 226-27 (Harcourt, Inc. 2007).
183 Goodman, supra note 151, at 216.
14See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 135, at 226-27.
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complications of enforcing a national set of bright-line standards for the
organic industry and market like the OFPA strives to create.' 8 5 However,
this choice renders the organic label devoid of any meaningful
sustainability guarantee. Consumers who want the opportunity to
purchase food on sustainable principles can only support such practices if
provided with additional label information.
4. Organic Food, Like Conventional Food, is Susceptible to Political
Corruption
The Standards Board, whose task it is to recommend organic
standards to the Secretary of Agriculture, is comprised of fifteen experts in
the environmental, marketing, and organic agriculture fields.18 6 Although
the OFPA only allows one position on the Standards Board to be filled by
a retailer "with significant trade in organic products,"' 8 7 in December of
2006, four industrial-scale retailers were appointed to the NOSB.' 8 This
infiltration of big business allows the representatives of General Mills and
Campbell Soup Co. to influence the national organic standards for the
United States.' 89 Furthermore, these four business representatives replace
the valuable board positions of the scientist with no industry ties, the
consumer interest advocate, and the organic handler or processor.190 The
vulnerability of the Standards Board puts the legitimacy of the NOP in
jeopardy because it allows the organic industry disproportionate influence
over the government regulations to which it is held; in essence, filling the
Standards Board positions with corporate representatives allows industry
to govern itself.'9'
185 See Lathrop, supra note 47, at 895-97.
17 U.S.C. § 6518(a)-(b) (2006).
1877 U.S.C. § 6518(b)(3) (2006).
1 Megan Tady, USDA Stocks Organics Board with Business Reps, NEWSTANDARD,
Dec. 20, 2006, http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article3635.cfm.
18 id.
190 Id.
1See John Bell Clark, Impact and Analysis of the U.S. Federal Organic Food
Production Act of 1990 with Particular Reference to the Great Lakes, 26 U. TOL. L. REv.
323, 329 (1995).
449
A SUPPLEMENTAL LABELING REGIME FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTS
There has also been significant pressure from special interest
groups to "water down" the definition of "organic" to increase their profit
margin.192 For example, in 2003, a Georgia poultry company called
Fieldale Farms persuaded Congressman Nathan Deal of Georgia to add a
last minute provision onto an omnibus spending bill in the U.S. House of
Representatives.' 93 The provision allowed Fieldale to feed its animals
non-organic food, yet still use the "USDA organic" label if the organic
food was too expensive, or double the price of standard non-organic
food.194 Fortunately, the vehement reaction of the organic movement
caused Congress to pass a bill reversing Section 771 less than 60 days
later. 195 Although Fieldale Farms ultimately did not succeed in its
attempted corrosion of the organic label, it stands as an illustrative
example of how the label is susceptible to changes which would corrupt
the purpose of the label.196
In 2007, dairy farmers made a similar attempt to dilute the potency
of the organic standards by hiring lobbyists and secretly approaching the
USDA regarding a new rule after the closing of a public comment
period.'97 The dairy processors proposed a weaker standard to allow
industrial dairies to deny pastureland to their lactating cows.'98 Again, a
vocal and active organic movement forced the USDA to specify pasture
requirements for lactating cows. However, the incident again made
evidence the national organic standards' vulnerability to industry
tampering. 99
192See Carroll, supra note 77, at 133.
193 See id. at 134.
194 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, H.R. J. Res. 108-7, 108th Cong. §
771 (2003); Carroll, supra note 77, at 134-35.
195 See Carroll, supra note 77, at 137.
196 H.R. 955, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003).197 See Mark A. Kastel, Organic Watchdog, USDA Headed to Court, FREE PRESs, Feb.
20, 2007, http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/3/2007/2437.
198 See id.; but see 7 C.F.R. § 205.237(a) (2010) (stating livestock feed requirements
under the National Organic Program).
199 Western Organic Dairy Producers Alliance News, The Integrity (W. Organic Dairy
Producers Alliance, Chico, CA) April, 2007, at 3, available at http://wodpa.org/
newsletters/2007/WODPA%2OApril%2007%20Issue%20(2).pdf.
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D. Problems with Asymmetric Information for Consumers
The purpose of federal organic legislation is to standardize and
regulate the market for organic food.200 While this goal is laudable, it
comes with a responsibility: once the government takes on the burden of
regulating a market, it has a continuing obligation to inform consumers of
the science, public health, environmental and ethical ramifications of their
purchases.20 1 Where the government fails to provide adequate consumer
information in market regulation, the government promotes an unhealthy
and inefficient market that will ultimately fail.202 The organic market is an
example of government failure to fully inform consumers of the
implications of their purchases. Without a more transparent labeling
system that allows consumers to purchase according to their organic
philosophy, the organic market will become increasingly inefficient and
anemic, in direct contravention of the OFPA. 203
The most worrisome risk to an organic label that fails to match
consumer expectations is the loss of value to the label itself. If consumers
feel that the organic label's potency has been diluted by the industry,
politics, or governmental misunderstanding of what "organic" actually
means to the organic community, consumers will distrust and eventually
disregard the label.204 The loss of value to the label will likely result in a
depressed organic market because consumers will not hold organic
products in high esteem, and therefore will not be willing to pay the price
premium associated with the label.205 Moreover, the increasing organic
sales of mega-retailers like Wal-Mart may cheapen the "organic brand"
because of the mega-retailers' push to drive down prices and further
200 7 U.S.C. §6501 (1)-(3) (2006).
201 Margaret Sova McCabe, Loco Labels and Marketing Madness: Improving How
Consumers Interpret Information in the American Food Economy, 17 J. L. & POL'Y 493,
498 (2009).202 Id.
203 See Harrison, supra note 135, at 228; Gutman, supra note 140, at 2375; see also 7
U.S.C. § 6501(1)-(3) (2006).204 See KASTEL, supra note 109, at 12.
205 See id.
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standardize the industry. 206 Although the OFPA was created to provide
some uniformity and standardization to the organic market, such efforts
were important only insofar as they vitalized the organic market.207 Over-
standardization and uniformity to the point where consumers lack choice
will kill, rather than reinforce, the organic market.208 David G. Cox, the
Cornucopia Institute's attorney for some of their organic enforcement
claims against the USDA, sums up the rift between consumer expectations
and USDA reality: "when consumers find out that their milk has come
from factory farms in desert states whose scale of operations endanger the
livelihood of hardworking families, and the milk is then shipped all around
the country, they feel betrayed."2 09
Farmer disillusionment is another risk the organic market faces
when its labels are too far removed from the ideals of the organic
210movement. Farmers may recognize the diminishing value of the
organic brand among consumers, and question whether the label is worth
the cost of regulatory compliance, transition, and annual fees to certifiers,
which can amount to more than $1,000 a year.2 11 Especially for small
farmers, who must already compete with low prices from industrial farms,
eroding consumer trust might persuade them to forego NOP
212
compliance. As Bill Evans, a California farmer with 2,000 acres of
farmland who has considered going organic, states, "if big business kills
the name .. . why go organic? 213
Consumer distrust of the organic label, coupled with farmer
disillusionment with the NOP creates a situation where the small-scale
206 See Endres, supra note 82, at 26; but see Baldwin, supra note 40, at 213 (arguing that
putting mega-food retailers such as Wal-Mart in a position of power will allow the
retailers to exert an environmentally responsible influence over suppliers and consumers).207 See Lathrop, supra note 47, at 890-92; see also 7 U.S.C. § 6501(3) (2006) (stating the
purpose of the OFPA to support a national organic food market).
See, e.g., Endres, supra note 82, at 26.
209 See Kastel, supra note 197.
10 Jake Whitney, Will the Term Organic Still Mean Anything When It's Adopted Whole
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producers that started the organic movement are turning away from the
organic label. 214 Instead, these small-scale farms are exceeding
government regulations by farming according to their own definitions of
organic and foregoing organic certification altogether. 215  When the
regulatory system caters to the most minimalist definition of organic, as
done by the NOP, "movement farmers," who are committed to a more
ideological definition of organic, will begin to market directly to their
communities through farmers' markets and CSAs, 2 16 strengthening local
markets while hurting the national market that the OFPA seeks to build.217
If the USDA organic label continues to be devalued by lack of consumer
faith, the national organic market will founder as its most dedicated
farmers exit in favor of direct marketing to a smaller, more local,b218
consumer base.
VI. THE BARRIERS TO A MARKET SOLUTION TO THE ORGANIC PROBLEM
A. USDA Monopolizes the Word "Organic"
There is a significant disconnect between consumers' views of
what organic means, and the USDA definition of organic that governs the
official "organic" label. Ideally, this divide would be bridged by the free
market, as it has been with other eco-labels. 219 For example, small
214 Harrison, supra note 135, at 213.
215
216 The term "CSA," or "community supported agriculture" represents an alternative food
system whereby a community of individuals pledge support to a farm operation so that
farmers and consumers provide mutual support and responsibility of food production.
United States Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Library, Community
Supported Agriculture, (May 5, 2011), http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/csa/csa.shtml.217 See Goodman, supra note 151, at 218.
218 See id219 See, e.g., Christopher Wedding, Toward Greater Ecological Intelligence in the United
States: Ten Statements with Statistics and Commentary Regarding Ecolabels, 6
SUSTAINABILITY: SC., PRAC., & POL'Y 1, 39 (2010) (noting that transparency and
information makes consumers increasingly receptive to purchasing based on
environmental and safety ideals and giving the examples of ENERGY STAR, LEED, and
Green Seal in the United States).
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farmers who surpass government regulations in pursuit of their organic
ideals would theoretically be able to label their foods with those ideals and
thereby fill a hole in the market for sustainable foods that go beyond
USDA's organic label. However, existing government labeling
regulations work against any increased strictness favored by the organic
market because the government has a monopoly on the word "organic."220
This works to the detriment of any farmers whose personal standards go
above and beyond those of the USDA, but are different than USDA
standards.22' Under the NOP, no certifier may hold a producer to any
standard different than those espoused by the USDA, regardless of the
heightened sustainability of those standards. 222 Therefore, the USDA
prevents its certifiers from providing a higher standard of certification than
"USDA organic."
The stymied potential of the free market to fix the organic program
was recognized as early as 2005, when Arthur, Harvey, a Maine organic
blueberry farmer, sued the Secretary of Agriculture, alleging that the
standards of the NOP were inconsistent with the OFPA.223 Harvey argued
it was wrong that neither the OFPA nor the NOP allowed private
certifying agents to require stricter standards than those required by the
USDA. 224 Although the court found against Harvey on this count, 2 he
was prescient in his recognition that the uniform requirements of the NOP
prevent a certifying agent from establishing a reputation based on stricter
standards for organic production.226 This inability for private certifiers to
create a quality-based reputation hinders a free market solution to the
problems of organic fraud and diminishing organic standards, problems
which are only compounded as mega-retailers enter the market and
220 See 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1)(A)-B) (2006); 7 C.F.R. § 205.200 (2007).221 Harrison, supra note 135, at 228.
222 See 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); 7 C.F.R. § 205.200 (2007).
223 Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2005).
224 Id. at 44.
225 The court found against Harvey's argument, deferring to agency discretion in
interpreting gaps in legislation. See Veneman, 396 F.3d at 45.2261d. at 44-45.
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certifiers who are less dedicated to organic ordeals engage in a
competitive race to the bottom.227
B. FDA Regulation of "Misleading"
The FDA's labeling regime, which all foods in the United States
are subject to, also creates a barrier to a market solution of the organic
problem. The FDA regulates food labels under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), which charges the FDA with protecting the
public from misbranded food.228 Food is deemed misbranded if the label
is "false or misleading" in "any particular" or in any "material aspect." 229
To determine whether a label is misleading, the FDA takes into account
the affirmative representations made or suggested by the statement, word,
design, or device, as well as the extent to which the label omits material
facts in light of those representations. 230 There are two types of food
labels: mandatory labels and voluntary labels.23' Mandatory labels are
required when a food contains an ingredient that would be important for
consumers to know, whereas a voluntary label is permitted if the label is
not misleading and it provides information that consumers might use in
their decision to purchase the product.232
The FDA has regulated misleading food labels strictly by carving
out a narrow definition of what is pertinent to consumers. For instance,
the FDA has consistently refused to require a mandatory label for
genetically modified foods, despite the overwhelming consumer interest in
knowing whether their food is a result of bioengineering. 233 The FDA's
227 See Green, supra note 179, at 813.
228 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2006).
229 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 101.18 (2000).
23021 U.S.C. § 321(n).
231 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006) (allowing the FDA to promulgate food label
regulations in the name of "honesty and fair dealing"); 21 C.F.R. § 101.43, 101.45 (2011)
(describing the regulations for voluntary labeling of raw produce and fish).
23 2 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.43, 101.45.
233 See FDA Guidance for Industry: Bioengineering, supra note 113; see also Benjamin
Onyango et. al., Measuring U.S. Consumer Preferences for Genetically Modified Foods
Using Choice Modeling Experiments: The Role of Price, Product Benefits and
Technology (Food Policy Institute, Working Paper No. WP 1104-017, 2004) (finding that
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position is that bioengineering itself is not a material change to a food, and
therefore does not require a mandatory label.234 Not only does the FDA
refuse to mandate a bioengineering label, but it prevents voluntarily
labeling of genetically modified food because it would be misleading to
imply that non-genetically modified foods are superior to their
conventional counterparts. 23 5 Additionally, the FDA claims there is no
material difference between milk from cows treated with growth
hormones and milk from cows that have not been so treated, thus
restricting voluntary labels discussing growth hormones. 236 In a case that
was settled in 2007, Monsanto Inc., a producer of bovine growth hormone,
sued a small Maine producer, Oakhurst Dairy, over Oakhurst's use of the
label, "Our Farmers' Pledge: No Artificial Growth Hormone." Though
the settlement terms were confidential, Oakhurst's new labels speak to the
FDA's reluctance to allow labels to advertise that foods are made without
hormones. The pledge on the new labels reads, "No Artificial Growth
Hormone Used" and the labels include a disclaimer that the FDA does not
recognize a significant difference in milk from cows treated with synthetic
growth hormones. 237
The FDA is particularly strict for labels that denote a food is "free"
of a certain product. For instance, a producer's statement that a food
product is "GMO-free" is misleading according to the FDA, because
GMO is an abbreviation for "genetically modified organism" and most
foods do not contain organisms. 238 Similarly, the FDA has also
disallowed dairy farmers from labeling their milk products "hormone-
consumers view genetic modification negatively and require added compensation before
accepting genetically modified foods such as bananas, cornflakes, or ground beef).
See FDA Draft Guidance on Bioengineering, supra note 113.
235 See id.
236 See, e.g., David Barboza, Monsanto Sues Dairy in Maine Over Label's Remarks on
Hormones, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at C3; Kristen Philipkoski, Got Hormones? Not
This Dairy, WIRED MAGAZINE, December 12, 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/
medtech/health/news/2003/12/61612.
m See Barboza, supra note 236.
238 See FDA Draft Guidance on Bioengineering, supra note 113.
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free" because "naturally occurring hormones are present in all milk and
milk products."239
Despite the fact that the FDA strictly enforces the misleading
standard with voluntary labels, it is more lenient with voluntary labels that
mitigate a mandatory label. For example, foods with a mandatory label of
"treated with radiation" are encouraged by the FDA to add a voluntary
"consumer education" label such as "this treatment does not induce
radioactivity." 240 Similarly, when producers choose to label their food to
reflect any bioengineering process, the FDA encourages them to add a
consumer education label such as "these tomatoes were genetically
engineered to improve texture." 24 1 Thus, in cases where industry is helped
by a voluntary label educating consumers as to the details of the food
process, the FDA not only permits, but explicitly encourages such detailed
labels.
Although the FDA's regulation of misleading labels is
inappropriately strict when applied to organic foods, there are good
reasons for the FDA to regulate certain food labels as misleading. For
example, the use of terms such as "fresh" and "natural" have been used to
mislead consumers, forcing the FDA to address the issue in the 1990s. 242
Although the FDA was unable to define "natural" as concretely and
reductively as the USDA has defined "organic," the agency did publish an
informal guidance policy in 1991 defining natural as having no artificial or
synthetic inputs. 243  Like "natural," the term "fresh" lies somewhere
239 See, e.g., FDA Warning Letter to Ronnybrook Farm Dairy (September 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2003/ucm
147704.htm.
240 Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. 13376,
13388 (Apr. 18, 1986).
241 See FDA Draft Guidance on Bioengineering, supra note 113.
242 See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles Petitions, Definition
of Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60421, 60466 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991) (offering guidance on the
use of "natural"); 21 C.F.R. § 101.95 (2011) (defining "fresh" as a descriptor to connote a
lack of processing).
243 See 56 Fed. Reg. 60421, 60466 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991). In January 2008, the FDA
announced its intentions to abandon the effort to formally define "natural" because of
more pressing concerns, a finite budget, and evidence that consumers were not being
sufficiently misled to make defining "natural" a priority. See Lorraine Heller, 'Natural'
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between "puffery" and consumer information that must not be
misleading. To address the issue, the FDA regulated the claim "fresh"
as a brand or descriptive term, and prohibited its use on items that have
been frozen, thermally or chemically processed, and on food containing
ingredients that have been concentrated or processed.245 Additionally, the
indiscriminant use of labels as "low calorie," "reduced calorie," "sugar
free" and "reduced sugar" in the early 1990s necessitated regulation
through the Nutrition Labeling Education Act ("NLEA") to protect
consumers from deceptive claims.246 The NLEA allowed the FDA to
define certain terms regarding these health claims, such as "light." 247
Interestingly, the FDA's regulation of these claims was also motivated by
consumer desire for consistency and information about what the various
health claims meant, a motivation yet to be truly implemented for organic
claims. 24
8
C. History of "Misleading" Regulation
In the past, the FDA has required labeling and advocated for
voluntary labels based on whether consumers wanted to use the
information in their purchasing decision. 249 For example, in 1986, the
FDA required mandatory labeling for irradiated food. 2 50 From then on,
Will Remain Undefined, Says FDA, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA, (Jan. 4, 2009), http://www
.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-Industry/Natural-will-remain-undefined-says-FDA.
244 See April L. Farris, The "Natural" Aversion: The FDA's Reluctance to Define a
Leading Food-Industry Marketing Claim, and the Pressing Need for a Workable Rule, 65
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 419 (2010).
245 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.95(a) (2011). Notably, the definition of "fresh" has been
criticized as an approach whose "one-size-fits all" standards go against consumer
assumptions when purchasing food labeled "fresh." See also Farris, supra note 244, at
419.
246 See 21 CFR 101.60(b)(2)-(5), (c)(1)(iii) (2011).
247 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1-535, 104 Stat.
2353; 56 Fed. Reg. 60421 at 60446.
248 See H.R. REP. No. 101-538, at 7 (1990).
249 See David Alan Nauheim, Comment, Food Labeling and the Consumer's Right to
Know: Give the People What They Want, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 97, 109-10 (Fall 2009).250 Id. at 109.
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where processing was not obvious, food bore the "radura" symbol and the
label "treated with radiation" or "treated by irradiation." 2 1 The initial
impetus behind the irradiation labeling regime was consumer interest in
whether their products were treated with radiation.252 In fact, half the
comments the FDA received on their proposed irradiation rule addressed
retail labeling and over 80% of those urged labeling to prevent consumer
deception.253 The FDA specifically addressed the significance consumers
placed on information from retail labels in the FDCA.254 Indeed, the FDA
stated that the materiality of the information under Section 201(n) of the
FDCA was not based on the worth of the information, but on "whether
consumers view such information as important." 255 As the irradiation
example shows, the FDA has a history of regulating food processes based
on the importance of the information to a consumer where the final
product is made "in semblance of a traditional food" even if food safety is
256
not implicated. For example, "bleached" flour, "enriched" farina,
orange juice "from concentrate" and "pasteurized" orange juice must all
be so labeled.257
Despite this rich history of making labeling decisions based on
consumer interest, and its particular success with irradiation labels, the
FDA has changed its stance on the importance of consumer interest in its
regulation of irradiated food. In November of 1997, Congress limited the
FDA labeling of irradiated food by prohibiting the FDA from requiring a
label statement to use print larger than that required for ingredients.258
Further, Congress directed the FDA to reconsider the label requirement
251 Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376,
13,399 (Apr. 18, 1986).252 id.
253 id.
254 See id.
255 id.256 See Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. at
13,388.
257Id.; 21 C.F.R §§ 137.205, 137.305(6)(b)(1), 146.145(c), 146.140(d)(2) (2011).
258 Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 64 Fed. Reg. 7834
(Feb. 17, 1999). In August of 1998, the FDA clarified that although irradiation labels
need be "prominent and conspicuous," prominence did not mean larger than usual type
size.
459
A SUPPLEMENTAL LABELING REGIME FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTS
altogether and seek public comment on changes.259 In 2007, the FDA
issued a proposed rule that suggested changing the labeling regime for
260irradiation. The new regime would require only those foods that were
materially changed to bear the radiation symbol and label, and in certain
cases would allow specific producers to use the label "pasteurized" instead
of "treated by irradiation." 26 1 The focus on physical change over
consumer interest in knowing what their food contains echoes the debate
about mandatory labels for genetically modified food; the old FDA
approach mandated labels for irradiated food because consumers wanted
to know that their food was irradiated, while the new FDA approach looks
only at whether the physical make-up of the technologically altered food
product is identical to the food it attempts to imitate.262 The FDA's stated
justification for the change admits as much by explaining the policy shift
as a change in focus from the rocess the food undergoes to the material
difference of the end product.26
It is evident the FDA is less concerned with consumer interest in
knowledge, and more concerned with the food industry's ability to sell
materially identical food without scaring consumers who can't tell the
difference between food and technologically altered food products without
a descriptive label.264 This new FDA policy should not apply, however, to
the organic sector because, as noted above, organic food regulations are
explicitly based on the food process.265 Consequently, the FDA should
regulate organics with the same attention to consumer interest that
characterized its 1986 labeling regulations for irradiated food and its
labeling of enriched flour, bleached flour, and juice from concentrate.
259 See id. at 7835.
260 See Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, Proposed Rule,
72 Fed. Reg. 16291 (April 4, 2007). This rule has yet to become a "Final Rule" and be
enacted.
261 See id.
262 See id. at 16295; 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,388; see also, FDA Guidance for Industry:
Bioengineering, supra note 113.
See Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, Proposed Rule,
72 Fed. Reg. at 16,295.
264 See id.
265 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.200, 205.201 (2011) (describing the general process of
producing USDA organic food).
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D. State Labeling Regimes Hindered by Free Speech Restrictions
Some states, unsatisfied with the FDA's new focus on the
superficiality of the finished product, have taken it upon themselves to
mandate labeling of certain food processes and ingredients that concern its
citizens. 266 However, some of these states have found themselves
thwarted in federal court by the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech.267 For instance, at issue in International Dairy Foods
Ass'n v. Amestoy, was a Vermont law requiring dairy farmers to label
products from cows treated with growth hormone.268 Vermont based its
law on the theory of consumers' right to know what goes into their
milk.269 The law was ultimately found unconstitutional by the Second
Circuit, who granted a preliminary injunction requested by a group of
dairy associations on free speech grounds.270 That court never decided the
case on the merits, but did note that "FDA has concluded that rBST has no
appreciable effect on the composition of milk produced by treated cows,
and that there are no human safety or health concerns associated with food
products derived from cows treated with rBST." 2 71 Although the court did
not doubt that Vermont's interest in satisfying its consumer's demand for
information, it held that even "strong consumer concern" was not a
substantial interest justifying the restriction on commercial speech that an
involuntary, state-mandated labeling regime would create.27 2
VII. THE SOLUTION: A SUPPLEMENTAL LABELING REGIME FOR ORGANICS
In order to fix the problem created by consumer distrust of the
organic system and the resulting loss of faith in the label, the FDA should
abandon the restrictive interpretation of its FDCA labeling authority and
allow certifiers to offer, and producers to affix, non-misleading labels to
266 See, e.g., Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).
26 7 See id. at 70.268 Id. at 67
269Id. at 73.
270 Id. at 73-74.271 Id. at 73.
272 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996).
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organic food. The USDA organic certification would open the door for a
supplemental labeling system that permits labels currently considered
"misleading" under the FDA's interpretation of the FDCA. The initial
USDA organic certification would in large part address the FDA's fears of
such labels deceiving consumers because the certification narrows the
range of producers who are issuing these labels to those who are already
under government supervision. This is the only way to put consumers in
the regulatory role that the OFPA has set out for them: "if private market
behavior is to serve the expansive evaluative function. . . proposed for it,
then consumers should receive an informational context that is
appropriately robust for the role they are being asked to serve." 2 73 In order
to give consumers the information they need to make a principled
purchase about the sustainability of their food, a food labeling system
whose plurality of labels matches the plurality of sustainable options is
necessary. In this plural system, labels would include an organic
certification and an additional label where warranted, such as "locally
grown," "produced according to biodynamic farming methods," "small-
farm grown," "polyculture methods used," or "locally produced." The
precise definitions and wording of these labels can be left to the certifiers,
provided that the USDA supervises the certifiers according to the OFPA
guidelines. 274 Labels such as "natural" and "fresh" would not be included
in a supplemental labeling regime because the FDA has already defined or
issued guidance on these terms.275 Moreover, if specific problems arise
with abuse of a particular label, the FDA could address those situations as
they arise in the same manner as the agency dealt with the controversies
over "natural" and "fresh." 276
This supplemental labeling system could also alleviate the
problems of imported food with questionable organic certification because
274 Kysar, supra note 125, at 535.
27 See 7 U.S.C. § 6514 (2006).
275 See, e.g., Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions,
Definition of Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,422.
276 Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,422.
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consumers would be more aware of their food choices. 277 As of 2007,
nearly 40% of organics came from overseas, where organic fraud is well
documented.278 United States' demand for organics is greater than
domestic organic supply, creating a market for foreign organics that runs
counter to the philosophy of the organic movement. 2 79 The need for
"quick and easy organic production" is enlarging the gulf between the
consumer ideal of organic and the actual quality of the food purchased.280
However, the U.S. demand for organics will likely shift as consumers
become more discerning and begin to search for specific attributes in
organic food that satisfy their individual reasons for buying organic. As
consumers begin to seek out certifications and labels indicating specific
qualities and levels of organic integrity, the market for imported organics
will likely diminish.2 8 1
A. New Labels Would Not be Misleading Under the FDCA
The FDA supports the use of independent certifying agents to meet
safety and security standards in U.S. food.282 Since the FDA already trusts
independent certifiers for food safety, and the USDA trusts independent
certifiers to award the organic seal,283 independent certifiers should be
trusted to enforce a supplemental labeling regime. The FDA can hold
supplemental certifiers accountable to the same standards mandated by the
OFPA, including a comprehensive self-assessment, on-site audits, and
assessment of the certifiers' conformity to the stated standards.284
Food labels are found misleading under the FDCA when they omit
information that is "material" or if they include information that would
277See generally Endres, supra note 82, at 28 (noting both the increasing American
demand for organics, causing an increase in foreign imports, and the power of consumers
to make choices that reflect their values when given information about their food).
278 See Audit Report 2010, supra note 94, at 28; Endres, supra note 82, at 35.
279 Endres, supra note 82 at 27.
280 Green, supra note 179, at 819.
281 See id.
282 FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Guidance For
Industry: Voluntary Third-Party Certification Programs for Foods and Feeds (Jan. 2009).
283 See id.; 7 C.F.R. § 205.400 (2011).
284 7 U.S.C. § 6514-15 (2006).
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cause a consumer to mistakenly purchase a product due to a confusing or
deceptive label.285 Using this definition of misleading, the FDA is
statutorily permitted to create a more relaxed interpretation for labels on
food that is already certified organic and may create a supplemental
labeling system for these foods without contravening the purpose of the
FDCA. Rather than mislead consumers, the additional labels would
attempt to clear up a misunderstanding between consumers and the USDA
organic label, which currently does not reflect consumers' organic ideals.
Supplemental labels can avoid being misleading by neither affirmatively
suggesting false food qualities, nor by omitting important information
about the food's production process. 287
The accuracy and precision of the supplemental label can be left to
a government-supervised set of certifiers, who should insist on meaningful
standards for each label attribute. The FDA has touted the benefits of
explanatory labels on food in order to inform consumers in certain cases,
such as "these tomatoes were genetically engineered to improve texture"
or "this product contains high oleic acid soybean oil from soybeans
developed using biotechnology to decrease the amount of saturated fat."2 88
Both of these labels educate consumers in the context of a negative label.
The first label is a voluntary disclosure of genetic modification with an
explanation to make the tomatoes more attractive to consumers who might
otherwise be put off by biotechnology. 2 89 The second is a mandatory
disclosure of high oleic acid that, again, helps explain the process and
alleviate consumer concerns. 2 90
Supplemental organic labels can use explanatory labels in the same
way, educating consumers and managing expectations by explaining what
the organic process does and where its value lies. For example, "these
organic tomatoes tested 100% negative for pesticide residue upon
harvest," "this zucchini has traveled less than fifty miles from its source,"
"the workers who picked these apples were paid a living wage" and, "this
28521 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(b) (2006).
. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).
288 FDA Guidance for Industry: Bioengineering, supra note 113.289 See id.290 See id.
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organic kale was grown without industrial machinery to reduce the amount
of oil consumed in its production." These exemplary labels both explain
the value of the process and tell consumers what it is they are, and are not,
buying. A consumer who wishes to buy locally harvested food for reasons
of community development will know the tomatoes, apples, and kale
mentioned above were not necessarily harvested locally, however the
zucchini was. Equally, a consumer who wishes to buy food that has been
harvested using the most energy efficient methods might willingly pay the
premium price for the kale produced without industrial machinery.
B. Possible Program Models
1. European Union
In the European Union ("EU"), organic standards are regulated by
each member state, which establishes a regulatory authority to provide
licenses to importers. 29 1 In June 2007, the EU organic production and
labeling regulations were revised, and those revisions came into effect on
January 1, 2009.292 Previous to the 2007 amendments, organic regulations
had been evolving in the EU since 1991, when a foundation was laid for
consumer protections and producer standards regarding organic food in all
EU member states. 293  By 1999, those regulations included animal
products and had provisions for animal welfare, veterinary treatment, and
manure management.294 Then, in March of 2000, a voluntary seal was
introduced letting consumers know that the product has been approved
organic: "Organic Farming - EC Control System."295 In 2006 and 2007,
new regulations on organic production and labeling were developed and
291 Dimitri & Oberholtzer, supra note 136, at 14.
292 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 O.J. (L 189/1), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/1189/118920070720en00010023
.pdf; see also Commission Regulation (EC) No. 889/2008 5 Sept. 2008 O.J. (L 250/1),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:250:
0001:0084:EN:PDF (implementing the 2007 labeling regulations).
293 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 of 24 June 1991 O.J.
294 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1804/1999 of 19 July 1999 O.J.
295 Commission Regulation (EC) No 331/2000 of 17 Dec. 1999 O.J.
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subsequently implemented in 2008.296 These most recent regulations
establish a new EU label and open up development of standards for wine
and other specialized products, as well as improving regulations on
organic imports to the EU. 2 97 The overarching EU guidelines prohibit the
use of GMOs in organic production, and prohibit all but the "technically
unavoidable presence" of genetically modified organisms in organic
products, stating that they are "incompatible with the concept of organic
production." 298 The regulations specify soil fertility, animal welfare, open
air grazing for livestock, and, notably, "consumer confidence" as organic
values.299 The regulations also specify that flexibility is necessary because
of geographic, climatic, and cultural difference between countries.300
Accordingly, the EU organic regulations, allow for EU member states to
develop their own national regulations and national logos for organic
products. The EU regulations also allow private certifiers to label
products as organic.3 o1 The current organic regime in the United States
would benefit from a labeling system that took into account consumer
views of issues such as GMOs, the geographic differences between states,
and the differences in consumer values between different states. For
example, in states with a large dairy industry, such as Vermont, the
hormone content of milk might be important to consumers, whereas in
states with a large beef industry, such as Texas, animal antibiotics might
be more important to consumers. Similarly, different state geographies
present different problems for organic farmers. For instance, in windy
plain states, the transference of pesticides by wind from non-organic farms
to organic ones is a concern that mountainous states might not need to
worry about.
296 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 O.J., available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/1_189/1_18920070720en00010023.pdf, see
also Comm'n Regulation (EC) No. 889/2008 5 Sept. 2008 O.J., available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSery.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:250:0001:0084:EN:PDF
(implementing the 2007 labeling regulations).
297 Comm'n Regulation (EC) No. 889/2008 5 Sept. 2008 O.J.
298 Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 at L 189/2.2 99 See id.300 See id.
301 Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 at L 189/4.
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In the EU, each importer must provide a list of producers and
handlers, and each of those producers and handlers must be certified by an
accredited certifying agent. 302 The EU has an existing network of
certifiers, some of whom insist on stricter standards than those stated in
the EU organic legislation. 303 Each certifier has a unique set of standards,
and a reputation for those standards, typically different or above the EU or
member state regulations.304 The allowance of different levels of organic
certification creates a tiered structure of different certificates with different
worth to countries and consumers. 305 Most EU countries require certifiers
to approve producers under the EU organic regulations at the producer's
request, in which case the certifier will affix the EU regulation label and
the member state label, but not the private certification label. 306 This
ensures the relevance of the EU organic regulations and allows certifiers
with more rigorous standards to maintain a business relationship with
those producers who only live up to the baseline organic standards.
2. Kosher Industry in the United States
The kosher foods industry in the United States is also a plural
system with an active community whose members buy kosher food for a
variety reasons, including quality, cleanliness, taste, and faith that the label
truly represents the portion of meat they are buying.307 The market for
kosher food, like the market for organic food, has grown in the last
decade. 30 In 2000, the U.S. kosher market was approximately nine
million consumers; by 2008, kosher sales had grown over 15% and
accounted for $12.5 billion in sales, as reported by the market research
302 Miles McEvoy, Organic Certification in the United States and Europe, WASH. TREE
FRUIT POSTHARVEST CONFERENCE, 2, Dec. 2003, http://postharvest.tfrec.wsu.edu/PC
2003E.pdf.303 DMIT & OBERHOLTZER, supra note 136, at 12.
0 See id. at 14.
305 See id
306 See id.
307 Gutman, supra note 140, at 2367.
308 See Malinda Geisler, "Kosher Industry Profile," AGRIC. MKTG. RES. CTR., http://www
.agmrc.org/markets industries/food/kosher industry_profile.cfm (updated Mar. 2010).
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firm, Mintel.3 09 Kosher food is also similar to organic food in that it
demands a price premium and thus presents an opportunity for consumer
fraud.310 The FDA does not strictly regulate kosher certification under the
"misleading" standards of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
because kosher products indicate a religious certification. 3 11 Instead,
kosher laws in the United States are privately enforced by third-party
certifiers who use a trademarked symbol to label products as adhering to
kosher standards.312 Each certifier develops a reputation for certain
standards and practices important to its demographic; these standards can
address issues of concern to the consumer community that go beyond the
religious standards of kosher food.313 Consumers buy from certifiers they
trust, whose standards reflect the consumers' principles. 314 Similarly, the
organic industry in the United States might develop a spectrum of
different certifiers who address the different environmental, health, social,
and ethical concerns behind organic consumption. For example, two
different certification bodies might accommodate two different sets of
consumers, one who buys organic because they want to support local
farmers, and one who buys organic because they want their food produced
through low-energy methods. 3 15
The kosher industry depends on the integrity and dedication of
independent certifying agents, who historically operate without much
guidance or supervision from a central authority.3 16 There are over 70
national kosher certifiers and over 100 international kosher certifiers. 3 17
309 d
310 See Gutman, supra note 140, at 2368.
311 Food Labeling for the 21st Century: A Global Agenda for Action, (Jan. 6, 2011, 7:39
PM), available at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/labelrept.pdf.
312 Gutman, supra note 140, at 2376.
3131d. at 2377.
314 See id. at 2377-79.
31s See id. at 2380.
316 See THE RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA, JEWISH PRINCIPLES AND ETHICAL
GUIDELINES ("JPEG") FOR THE KOSHER INDUSTRY 1 (2010), http://www.rabbis.org/
PDFS/JPEGGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE KOSHER
INDUSTRY].
See, e.g., Kashrus Agencies, http://www.kashrut.com/agencies/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2011).
468
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3
Typically, the kosher certifying agents and the producers have a close
relationship with one another that prevents the producers from trying to
defraud the certifiers. 318 Instead, the closeness between certifier and
producer creates certain expectations on behalf of the certifier, preventing
the kosher certifiers from engaging in a free market race to the bottom
with their standards. 3 19 However, although the kosher industry depends on
independent certifiers with varying guidelines, the Rabbinical Council of
America has suggested general industry guidelines in the wake of news
stories decrying the mistreatment of laborers and animals which have the
potential to tarnish the reputation of the kosher seal.320
Iowa-based Agriprocessors Inc., the nation's largest kosher
meatpacking plant, is run by the Rubashkin family of New York.32 1 It
represents for the kosher industry what industrial farms represent for the
organic industry: a failed experiment at combining a deeply held food
philosophy with the mechanics of modem mass production. Like mega-
retailers and industrial organic farms such as Aurora Organic Dairy,
Agriprocessors' food sells in major retail chains such as Wal-Mart and
Trader Joe's. 323 Also like Aurora Organic Dairy and industrial organics of
its ilk, Agriprocessors came under attack for failing to live up to the spirit
behind the kosher movement by violating the ethical and social tenets of
the label.324
In 2004, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals ("PETA")
released footage of Agriprocessors' cattle in pain for several minutes after
their required ritual slaughter.325 Since the PETA report of cruelty at their
See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE KOSHER INDUSTRY, supra note 316, at 1.
3 See id.
32o Moses L. Pava, Opinion, Kosher "Ethical Guidelines" Sidestepped Ethics, THE
JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Mar. 26, 2010, available at http://www.forward.com/articles/
126676/.






325 See Levi Brackman & Rivkah Lubitch, Kosher Slaughterhouse Owners Surrounded by
Scandal, YNETNEWS.COM (May 5, 2008), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
469
A SUPPLEMENTAL LABELING REGIME FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTS
Iowa facility, other ethical transgressions of Agriprocessors, Inc. have
come to light which caused the kosher community to re-evaluate what
kosher certification in America really meant.326
One kosher certifier, O.U. Kosher, threatened to withdraw its seal
of kosher certification unless Agriprocessors changed its management,
forcing the company to name a new chief executive officer.327 However,
challenging the infringing producers was not enough for the kosher
community, and consumers demanded a new certification. 32 8 The new
certification was conceived by Rabbi Morris Allen of Minnesota and was
originally called Hechsher Tzedek or "Justice Certification." 329 The
certification, later called magen tzedek or "seal of justice," takes into
consideration ethical and social justice ideals with respect to "labor
concerns, animal welfare, environmental impact, consumer issues and
corporate integrity." 330
Kosher consumers, like organic consumers, were unhappy with the
existing levels of certification for kosher food. 33' However, unlike organic
consumers, the kosher community was able to demand and implement a
0,7340,L-3577905,00.html. The Rubashkin family, owners of Agriprocessors, Inc. were
further plagued by bad press involving the charges of fraud and misusing of federal
government grant money incurred by the business family's son and son-in-law,
respectively.
See Edwin Black, Is A Life Sentence for Iowa Kosher Butcher Disproportionate
Justice?, The Cutting Edge (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index
.php?article=12123; see also FAILEDMESSIAH.COM (December 7, 2004), http://
failedmessiah.wordpress.com/category/kosher-meat-scandal/page/22/ (a blog devoted
entirely to scandals in the Orthodox Jewish community provides a lengthy discussion of
the Agriprocessors case).
327 Eric Yoffie, Opinion, Orthodoxy's Kosher Crisis, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, (Oct. 3,
2008), http://www.forward.com/articles/14271/.
328 New Ethical Seal Will Take Kashrut Where it Must Go, JWEEKLY.COM (May 27,
2010), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/58207/new-ethical-seal-will-take-kash
rut-where-it-must-go/.
329 MAGEN TZEDEK, http://magentzedek.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
330 Mission Statement, MAGEN TZEDEK, http://magentzedek.org/?page-id= 17 (last visited
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new, more stringent level of environmentally and socially sustainable
certification.332 This is because the power of the kosher community to act
as an organized group was not thwarted by USDA monopolization of the
standards for "kosher," nor by FDA regulations of "misleading" labels and
FDA fear of food quality implications. The action of O.U. Kosher in
demanding higher standards from Agriprocessors represents the opposite
of what is happening in the organic industry today. Rather than engaging
in a race to the bottom, the pressure of the kosher community and the
close relationship between certifier and producer forced O.U. Kosher to
hold Agriprocessors accountable. 333 Similar "trickle up" influence would
be possible for organic consumers and certifiers if the FDA regulations on
supplemental labels encouraged consumer awareness rather than end-
product aesthetics.
C. Why a Supplemental Labeling System Would Work in the United States
1. Existing Environmental Certifiers Can Create Supplemental Labeling
Standards
There are existing certifiers, both international and domestic,
whose standards are already higher than the USDA and who would be in a
good position, to establish standards for a supplemental labeling system.334
For example, the definition of "organic" used by the International
Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements ("IFOAM") includes
farming methods that "promote the environmentally, socially, and
economically sound production of food." 335  These standards, while
arguably more nebulous than the USDA standards, are also more rigorous.
A farm which adheres to these "environmentally, socially, and
economically sound" methods would be worthy of having its products
332 See id.
See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE KOSHER INDUSTRY, supra note 333, at 1; Yoffie,
supra note 327.
334 See, e.g., DMITRI & OBERHOLTZER, supra note 136, at 12.
335 Id., see also Miles Mcevoy, Organic Certification in the United States and Europe,
Washington Tree Fruit Postharvest Conference, December 2008, http://postharvest.tfrec
.wsu.edu/PC2003E.pdf.
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come with a label or additional certification seal stating that its production
methods were in accordance with the stricter IFOAM organic standards
with a brief explanation of those standards.
IFOAM is not the only organic certifier whose standards are more
rigorous than those of the FDA. The Nebraska based Organic Crop
Improvement Association ("OCIA") has a definition of "organic" similar
in philosophy to that of IFOAM: "an organic food system .. . enhances
life and health, is ecologically and economically sustainable, and gives a
fair return and dignity to its merchants, to its laborers, and to the stewards
of its living soil." 33 6 Demeter International, a European-based certifier, is
also an existing non-profit certifying agent with specific standards for
biodynamic farming that exceed U.S. government regulations for organic
food.337 Demeter has created a Biodynamic@ Brand that embodies the
principles of biodynamic farming, including the recognition of the entire
338farm as a living organism and energy-saving farming techniques.
Unlike IFOAM and OCIA, Demeter certification reflects a specific type of
farming whose basic standards involve a spirituality and recognition of the
farm organism beyond that of traditional organic farming. 339
336 ORGANIC CROP IMPROVEMENT Ass'N INT'L, INC., Bylaws, 9 (effective Feb. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.ocia.org/QMS/EN/QS/Misc/EN-QS-M-002.pdf.
DEMETER INT'L, What is Demeter: This is Demeter, (2011), http://www.demeter.net.
Biodynamic farming is a farming system that arose in reaction to the modem
proliferation of fertilizer and pesticide use in farming. Biodynamic farming conceives of
the farm as a whole organism, placing emphasis on the holistic elements of the farm, such
as nutrient recycling, soil maintenance, and livestock and crop well-being. Steve Diver,
Biodynamic Farming and Compost Preparation, ALT. FARMING SYS. GUIDE, 1-2 (1999),
available at https://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/summaries/summary.php?pub-290.
DEMETER INT'L, Production Standards, 6, 11 (June 2009), available at http://demeter
.net/standards/stproduction e.pdf.
See id. at 5, Harrison, supra note 135 at 231. It has been noted by scholars that
certifiers such as OCIA, Demeter, and IFOAM embody the philosophical principles of
the organic movement. See, generally, Luanne Lohr, Implications of Organic
Certlyication for Market Structure and Trade, 80 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 1125, 1127
(1998).
472
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3
2. The Organic Movement's Dedication
In order for a supplemental labeling system to work effectively, the
organic movement must be passionate and organized enough to come
together and produce certifiers who are willing to create new labels and
standards for sustainable organics. Although certifiers currently exist to
step into this role, the industry requires more competition and more
diversity in specializations from certifying agents in order for the
supplemental labeling system to be meaningful. The organic community
in the United States is dedicated and coordinated enough to create these
new labeling standards. 34 0
Consumer education in the organic community does not lie
dormant; rather, "consumption communities organized around process-
related issues appear destined to become some of the most active and
visible citizens' groups of global society."341 These active, organized,
organic communities spoke with a powerful voice during the years when
the USDA was finalizing the definition of organic. For example, a barrage
of consumer comments stopped the USDA from allowing bioengineering,
irradiation, and sewage sludge from being allowed in USDA organic
food.342  Similarly, the organic industry, led by the Organic Trade
Association, rallied when organic standards stood to be compromised by
Section 771 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, which
would have allowed producers to use non-organic feed for cows whose
milk was later marketed as "organic." 343  The organic community
340 See Kysar, supra note 125.
34 1 Id. at 590.
342 See Nat'l Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 13,512, 13,512-14 (proposed Mar. 13, 2000)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (noting that 275,603 commenters opposed the use of
bioengineering, sludge, and irradiation in organic products).
343 See Agric., Rural Dev., Food and Drug Admin., and Related Agencies Programs
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 771, 117 Stat. 11 (2003); OTA Launches
Campaign to Roll Back Redefinition of "Organic ", Food & Drink Weekly, Mar. 17,
2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEUY/is_10_9/ai_98945365/
?tag-content;coll.
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advocated for the Organic Restoration Act of 2003 to repeal Section 771,
shocking Congress with the force of their convictions.344
With this history and tradition of affection change, the organic
community certainly has the power and dedication to come together and
demand a better regime for organic labeling.
VIII. POTENTIAL PITFALLS TO A SUPPLEMENTAL LABELING REGIME
A. Enforcement
The success of a supplemental system of organic labels is
dependent on enforcement of the current organic standards, which act as a
gatekeeper for the supplemental labels. Accordingly, the USDA and FDA
must improve their enforcement and supervision of third-party certifiers
since these independent certifying agents would also be in charge of
additional labels. 345 Certifier honesty is crucial to the quality of consumer
information because certifiers communicate information about producers
to consumers each time they allow a producer to display the USDA
organic seal. Consumer information, in turn, is crucial to the effectiveness
of a market-driven regulation like the OFPA.346
In March of 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Office of
the Inspector General found that the NOP officials need to further improve
controls on enforcement of organic products and standards.3 47 Currently,
NOP does not do a sufficient job of taking enforcement actions against
improperly marketed non-organic products sold under the USDA organic
3" Carroll, supra note 77, at 137 (noting Congressional amazement at the organic
movement's beliefs, manifested by the April 9, 2003 article in Capital Hill's newspaper,
Roll Call, about the Whole Foods Market campaign to change Section 771); see also
H.R. 955, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108 cong bills&docid=f:h955ih.txt.pdf (the House Bill overriding
section 771); S. 457, 108th Cong. § 1(2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo
.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 08 cong bills&docid=f:s457is.txt.pdf (the Senate Bill
overriding section 771).
345 See generally Audit Report 2010, supra note 94.
346 Kysar, supra note 125, at 561.
347 See Audit Report 2010, supra note 94, at 1.
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label.3 48 Further, NOP does not incorporate periodic residue testing into
its enforcement, in direct contravention of the OFPA.3 49  NOP also
continues to violate the provisions of the OFPA in failing to assemble a
peer review panel to annually evaluate accreditation procedures for third-
party certifiers.350 If the NOP fails to address these enforcement issues, it
will likely be unable to properly enforce the standards of third-party
certifiers with additional sustainability standards. However, the NOP's
response to the audit report indicates that it will begin to address these
enforcement issues immediately.3 5' When the 2005 Audit Report revealed
similar flaws in NOP's enforcement protocol, NOP addressed eight out of
ten recommendations in time for the 2010 audit. 352 This shows that
although the fairly new and under-funded national organic program is
experiencing growing pains, it is capable of making progress toward strict,
reliable enforcement of organic standards. 353
B. Over-Information and Consumer Confusion
Consumer confusion resulting from an abundance of conflicting
information about which foods were genuinely organic served as the
motivating factor behind Congress's passage of the OFPA.354 There is a
possibility that a supplemental labeling regime for organic foods, which
348 d. at 8-9.
349 Id. at 16-17.
350 Id. at 18-19.
351 AGRIC. MKTG. SERV. RESPONSE TO OIG AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS, OIG AUDIT
REPORT No. 01601-03-HY (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/
01601-03-HY.pdf, [hereinafter "AMS RESPONSE TO AUDIT"]. The AMS response
specifically notes an upcoming increase in the agency's budget and staff that will help
them respond in full to the recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General.
352 AUDIT REPORT 2010, supra note 94, at 10, 18, 19, 35. However, the former NOP
director also responded that the agency's inability to effectively oversee the organic
standards was due to lack of resources, a problem that must be addressed by Congress or
the USDA. See id. at 9.
353 See generally, AMS Response to Audit, supra note 351 (outlining specific strategies
to address recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General).
354 See Organic Foods Prod. Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); see also Hornstein,
supra note 132, at 1550.
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would allow producers to trumpet the sustainability and ethical values of
their products, will result in another cacophony of messages that confuses
the consumer. However, this potentiality is frustrated when one takes into
account that the only food products permitted to access the supplemental
labeling system will already have been certified USDA Organic. This will
limit the pool of producers applying for such certification to those already
committed to the organic cause and willing to apply for organic
certification. These producers will be less likely to commit organic fraud
because of their dedication to the organic philosophy, assuming that the
USDA does an adequate job of weeding out corrupt producers by strictly
enforcing the NOP standards. One need only look to the kosher industry
to see an example of how little oversight is needed when producers are
committed to the underlying certification philosophy.
Kosher food certification operates without much guidance or
central supervision. 355 It is instead reliant on the integrity of producers
and certifiers. 356 Furthermore, the relationship between kosher producers
and certifiers deters producers from lowering their standards in order to
attract more business. 57 A similarly close relationship between producers
and certifiers founded upon shared ideals could exist within the organic
food industry if the supplemental labeling regime applies only to those
producers already certified organic, and who choose to advertise the extra
sustainability or ethical measures taken with their products. Such a
relationship would deter fraud and certifying agents' inclination to lower
their own standards in order to get more business. This closeness and the
producers' natural allegiance to the organic movement will likely thwart
the same type of grand-scale consumer fraud that prompted the need for
the OFPA.
C. Consequences of Consumer Education
Another potential pitfall of a supplemental labeling system is the
fear that consumers might misjudge the effect of their choice. A criticism
3 See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE KOSHER INDUSTRY, supra note 316, at 1.356 See id.
357 See id.
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of consumer education through labeling is that consumers make choices
that they think will benefit their interests, but in fact do not. 35 8 It is argued
that misguided consumers will make choices based on imperfect
information that harm a certain industry. 3 59 This argument has been used
by genetically modified food producers and supporters who fear that
mandatory labeling, declaring the food to have been genetically
engineered, will scare consumers away from a perfectly safe food
product.360
However, the preceding argument is flawed for two reasons. First,
it ignores consumers' true intelligence, and second, it fails to distinguish
between mandatory and voluntary labels. For consumers, what looks like
irrationality might simply be a choice that policymakers did not consider;
often, consumers are not irrational or misguided, but simply expressing an
aversion to risk and a more diverse collection of concerns than legislators
do. 36 1 Consumers consider a wider network of ethical, environmental,
social, and health concerns than policy-makers and therefore, their choices
might not be misjudgments, but rather might be made for a different effect
than those of lawmakers. 362
Additionally, the argument that consumer education might give
consumers only enough information to misjudge the effect of their choice
fails to make a relevant distinction between voluntary labels, which are
typically positive and mandatory labels, which are typically negative.363
Negative mandatory labels may scare consumers because they serve as a
warning; therefore, even consumers who do not understand the warning
understand its ominous tone and may stay away from a food that is safe
for that particular consumer. In contrast, positive voluntary labels provide
valuable information to discerning consumers who make principled
purchases.364 Positive labeling aids those consumers in making an
See Kysar, supra note 125, at 581.
319 See id. at 584.360 See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Cloned Meat, Voluntary Food Labeling, and Organic
Oreos, 8 PIERCE. L. REv. 31, 77-78 (2009).
361 Kysar, supra note 125, at 584.3 62See id. at 581.
363 See id. at 561-62.
36Byrne, supra note 360, at 78.
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educated purchase that lines up with their preferences.365 A supplemental
labeling system for organic products would be comprised of voluntary
labels with positive claims, effectively educating a market of consumers
who care about the organic processes and origins of their food.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although many Americans view the organic label as a way to
assuage their concerns about the environmental, health, social, and ethical
impact of modem agriculture, the USDA organic label fails in many ways
to represent the values Americans ascribe to it. The lack of transparency
in the food labeling process renders the organic label inadequate to
provide all the information consumers seek. The free market is unable to
remedy the inadequacies of the USDA organic label with a more
informative supplemental labeling system because the current FDA
regulations will likely prohibit such labels as "misleading." A
supplemental labeling system might be successfully modeled off of the
European Union's organic labeling system or the United States' kosher
labeling system, both of which provide myriad information for consumers
with different purchasing motivations. A supplemental organic labeling
system may take into account the size of the farm of origin, the
environmental sustainability of farming methods, the treatment of laborers
and health of the finished food product. Such a system would likely
address the concerns of American consumers who seek to make more
informed, environmentally sustainable and socially responsible organic
choices. The organic community in the United States has the
responsibility now to demand from federal agencies an organic labeling
regime that, like those labeling regimes in Europe and the kosher industry,
gives consumers the information they need to make informed food
choices.
365 See id.
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